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 This dissertation examines unrelated diversification strategies in business group- 
affiliated firms. In essay 1, using an enriched power-seeking framework, I provide a fresh 
angle to explain the motives and performance of unrelated diversification strategy in business 
group-affiliated firms. I argue that managers in business group-affiliated firms are likely to 
engage in unrelated diversification as a strategic choice, or a “protective investment”, to 
protect the resources generated by the affiliated firms from being shared by other affiliated 
firms in the same group or to compete for a larger share of group-level resources. Unrelated 
diversification strategy can serve such purposes because it increases an affiliated firm’s 
ability to influence the group headquarter,  changes the compositions of the firm’s assets to 
harder-to-expropriate physical and intangible assets and signals for the firm’s need of more 
resources. Further, this study also suggests that the impact of acquired resources on the 
diversification-performance relationship hinges on the market availability of the resources.  
In essay 2 of this dissertation, drawing upon identity theory and social identity theory, 
I investigate the contingent role of group-dispatched executive directors in the unrelated 
diversification decision in group-affiliated firms. I argue that, group-dispatched executive 
directors have both group-affiliation identity and executive identity. Both identities are 
relevant and potentially conflicting in assessing a protective investment, such as unrelated 
diversification. I identify directors’ organizational tenure, group-affiliated firms’ 
performance and their dependence on the groups as relevant contextual or reflexive factors to 
determine which identity is more salient in the decision process.  
I test my theoretical framework and hypotheses using publicly listed group-affiliated 




Key words: Business group, unrelated diversification, slack resources, power-seeking 
perspective, board of directors, identity theory, social identity theory.   
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background: Unrelated Diversification in Firms Affiliated with Business Groups 
In this dissertation, I address the following research questions: (1) Why do firms affiliated 
with diversified business groups conduct unrelated diversification themselves? (2) What is 
the outcome of such strategy? (3) What is the role of group-affiliated executive directors in 
such strategy? 
Extensive research investigates the relationship between diversification and economic 
performance (e.g. Rumelt, 1982; Bettis, 1981; Christensen and Montgomery, 1981; Teece, 
1982; Wernerfelt and Montgomery, 1988; Ramanujam and Varadarajan, 1989; Hoskisson 
and Hitt, 1990; Markides and Williamson, 1996; Wan & Hoskisson, 2003; Gary, 2005; 
Miller, 2006). To managers, diversification is important because the success or failure of a 
new venture can greatly influence a firm’s future growth and profitability (Rumelt, 1982). To 
researchers, the observed large numbers of diversification activities in the United States, 
Europe, and Asia also beget attention in the underlying motives and performance outcome of 
diversification (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990; Datta, Rajagopalan and Rasheed, 1991). In spite of 
the extensive work on diversification of independent firms, there is relatively little empirical 
research examining diversification in another distinct organizational form, i.e. the business 
group-affiliated firms. Figure 1 illustrates the diversification strategy in an independent firm 
and a business group-affiliated firm.  
The leading theoretical argument to explain unrelated diversification is internal 
market efficiency perspective. It suggests that, in emerging economies where the 
development of institution infrastructure is lacking, unrelated diversification helps firms 
manage “institution voids”. Business groups, defined as “a set of legally independent 
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companies, with activities in multiple industries, that are linked as affiliates through 
persistent informal links and formal relationships such as equity, director, and operating ties” 
(Khanna and Rivkin, 2001), act as internal markets for their affiliated firms. This implies that 
diversification at the group level substitutes for and precludes diversification at the affiliate 
level (Charabarti, Singh, & Mahmood, 2007). Thus, there might be less need and fewer 
benefits for group-affiliated firms diversifying themselves. This literature expects that 
diversification occurring at the group level is more effective than that occurring at an 
individual affiliated firm level (Chang and Hong, 2000; Khanna and Palepu, 1997; Kock and 
Guillen, 2001).  
In the business world, however, companies affiliated with business group in China, 
India, Korea, and other emerging economies, are evidently heavily diversified, producing 
many products, extensively integrated, and apparently are always eager to take on more 
products (Charabarti, Singh, & Mahmood, 2007). In China, for an example, Wan Xiang 
Group (see Figure 1) owned by Lu Guanqiu family mainly manufactures automobile 
accessories, but it also operates in property development, agriculture, and finance sectors. Its 
main affiliate, Wan Xiang Qian Chao Company, is listed in Shenzhen Stock Exchange and 
diversifies itself into trading and finance sector beside its automobile accessory 
manufacturing business. In other parts of the world, well-diversified group-affiliated firms 
such as Samsung Electronics in Korea, the Samsung group’s major affiliated firm, are also 
observed.  
 Therefore, motivated by the seemingly conflicting theoretical prediction and 
practical evidence, this dissertation focuses on the motive, performance and control system 
regarding unrelated diversification in group-affiliated firms.  
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Figure 1.1 Unrelated Diversification in Independent Firms (Left) V.S. in Group-affiliated Firms (Right) 
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1.2 Essay 1: Diversification and Internal Resource Transfer in Business Groups 
Despite the anecdotal and empirical evidence, which suggests that group-affiliated 
firms do diversify (Chang and Hong, 2002), the questions of why firms affiliated with 
diversified business group diversify themselves and what is the outcome of such strategy 
remain unanswered. In essay 1, addressing these research questions, I enrich the power-
seeking framework in internal market literature (Scharfstein & Stein, 2000; Rajan, Servaes, 
& Zingales, 2000) and employ it to provide a fresh angle to explain the motives and 
performance of unrelated diversification strategy in group-affiliated firms. In this enriched 
power-seeking framework, I assume that there exist: (1) information asymmetry between 
group headquarters and their affiliated firms; and (2) interest divergence between the two 
parties. Based on the two assumptions, I argue that managers in group-affiliated firms prefer 
to engage in unrelated diversification, as a strategic choice, or “protective investment”. On 
one hand, it is a “defensive move” to protect the resources generated by the affiliated firms 
from being shared by other affiliated firms in the group. On the other hand, such strategy also 
serves as a “preemptive move”, helping the affiliated firms compete for a larger share of 
group-level resources. This is because unrelated diversificaiton, first, increases the affiliated 
firms’ ability to influence the group headquarters to either supply more resources or limit 
transfer away of resources (Ranjan et al., 2000). Second, it changes the compositions of firms’ 
assets away from cash to harder-to-expropriate physical and  intangible assets (Beneish et al. 
2008). Moreover, diversification strategy signals the need of more resources in the group-
affiliated firms. As a restult, the first study suggests that managers in group-affiliated firms 
can play a significant role in influencing the resource allocation decision in a business group.  
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This study also suggests that the impact of acquired resources on the diversification-
performance relationship is heterogenous and hinges on the market availability of the 
resources. Acquiring market unavailable resources from business groups help affiliated firms 
gain higher returns because such resources alleviate their constraints in diversification 
strategies (Kumar, 2009). In contrast, excess market available resources injected from 
business groups may exacerbate the agency problem by promoting undisciplined investments, 
encouraging the pursuit of pet projects (Nohria and Gulati, 1996), or rendering the 
management of the affiliated companies less diligent in their pursuit of efficiencies (Hundley 
and Jacobson, 1998). I test the hypotheses on a longitudinal sample of approximately 790 
group-affiliated firms over a 5-year period from 2001 to 2005 and find general support to my 
predictions.  
1.3 Essay 2: Control Role or Resource Role? The Contingent Role of Group-
Dispatched Executive Directors 
The theoretical framework and empirical evidence in the essay 1 highlight the 
information asymmetry and interest divergence problems between group headquarters and 
affiliated firms surrounding unrelated diversification strategy. The findings of the essay 1 
naturally lead to the next research question of interest: how do group headquarters control 
such information asymmetry and interest divergence problems? Dispatching directors to sit 
on the affiliated firms’ boards is a central governance mechanism adopted by many business 
groups. In essay 2, I examine the contingent role of group-dispatched executive directors in 
group-affiliated firms’ unrelated diversification strategy.  
I assert that, like other directors, group-dispatched directors can be executive 
directors or non-executive directors. While the control role of group-dispatched non-
executive directors is relatively obvious, the role of group-dispatched executive directors is 
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less clear and invites further research. This is because, as executive directors, they are also 
tied with the affiliated firms in various aspects and their interests may gradually align better 
with the affiliated firms’, rather than with the groups’. Therefore, they could use their 
contacts and influence in the groups to obtain more resources to help the pursuing 
investments that benefit them more directly, or playing the “resource role”. 
To theoretically ground my investigation of the “control role” or “resource role” of 
group-dispatched executive directors, I draw upon identity theory (Mead, 1934; Stryker, 
1968; Burke and Reitzes, 1981; Callero, 1985; Stryker and Burke, 2000) and social identity 
theory (Tajfel, 1978, 1981; Tajfel and Turner, 1985; Turner, 1975, 1982, 1984, 1985) in the 
social psychology literature. Central propositions of identity theory states that one performs 
according to the expectations associated with the “identity” that he categorizes himself as 
(Buke and Tully 1977; Thoits, 1986). These expectations guide the behaviors of an 
individual (Burke, 1991; Burke and Reitzes, 1981). Social identity theory provides a similar 
view while focusing on the norms and expectations of a social category and linking them to 
behaviors (Hogg et al., 1995; Ashforth and Mael, 1996). An individual may have multiple 
identities, such as directors and executives, and these identities can sometimes conflict with 
one another and, therefore, must be “managed” or “balanced” (Allen, Wilder, & Atkinson, 
1983; Ashforth & Mael, 1989). The salience of an identity depends on (1) contextual factors 
and (2) reflexive factors (Stryker, 1968; Burke & Reitzes, 1981). In sum, identity theory and 
social identity theory suggest that board members’ multiple identities represent important 
antecedents to their behaviors, yet the salience of a specific identity is expected to vary based 
on contextual and reflexive factors.   
15 
 
In the second study, I investigate the role of group-dispatched executive directors 
facing a situation when both their group-affiliation identity and executive identity are 
relevant: assessing a protective investment through unrelated diversification. Utilizing the 
mechanisms and logic of identity theory and social identity theory, I identify a director’s 
organizational tenure, an affiliated firm’s performance and dependence on the group as 
relevant factors to determine the salience of a specific identity. Firstly, I suggest that longer 
organizational tenure of a group-dispatched executive director strengthens his/her 
commitment with the affiliated firm, making the executive identity more salient. Secondly, 
better performance of a group-affiliated firm, reflecting the executive role performance and 
satisfaction of the role expectations, will also help the executive identity become more salient. 
Lastly, the more an affiliated firm is embedded in the business network of its group, the more 
salient is the group-affiliation identity in a group-affiliated executive director. I test the 
hypotheses using 790 group-affiliated listed firms in China over a 3-year period from 2003 to 
2005 and find support for my theoretical arguments.   
1.4 Research Context: The Business Groups in China 
 I set my research context in China. An important, but rarely studied, feature of 
China’s industrial growth has been the strong development of its business groups. In 
countries like South Korea and China boundaries of business groups have been defined more 
likely based upon ownership (Chang, 2003a; Yiu, Bruton, & Lu, 2005). For instance, in 
South Korea, the Korean Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) legally defines a business group as 
‘a group of companies, more than 30% of whose shares are owned by some individuals or by 
companies controlled by those individuals, and whose management such as appointing 
officers is substantially affected’. In China, according to the State Administration for 
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Industry and Commerce (SAIC),  a business group should have a core company with a 
registered capital of over 50 million yuan (US$6 million), at least five affiliated companies 
with a major shareholding position (>51%), and a total registered capital (of the core and 
other affiliated companies) of over 100 million yuan (US$12 million). In this study, I refer to 
this official definition and focus on the business group in which affiliated companies are 
owned wholly or partially by a core company. 
 The structure of business groups varies widely among contexts. A Japanese keiretsu 
usually consists of a bank, a holding or trading company, and a group of manufacturing firms, 
which operate in diverse industries (Gerlach 1992; Lincoln et al. 1992). There are vertical 
keiretsus and horizontal keiretsus. In Korea, chaebols are typically controlled by one family 
or a few families and mostly are organized vertically (Kim, 1991). Business groups in 
Taiwan are relatively small and loosely integrated entities. Compared to the authoritarian 
style common in Korean and Japanese groups, they are characterized by a more decentralized 
managerial style (Fields 1995; Hamilton and Kao 1990). Like the keiretsus and chaebols, 
group-affiliated firms in Chinese business groups are connected with intensive inter-firm 
relations, including dispatched directors, debt relations, and trade ties (Li, 1995; Ma and Lu, 
2005).  
Not surprisingly, Chinese business groups have developed their own unique structure. 
Firstly, there were two types of business groups in China. The first type of business groups 
consists of large, primarily state-owned firms. The second type of business groups consists of 
groups of relatively small, often family-owned firms. Groups first emerged predominantly in 
the state-owned sector. Since 1978, China’s government has experimented with market-
oriented industrial reform, which aimed at enhancing the financial performance and 
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efficiency of the nation’s enterprises. Policy makers in China studied the keiretsus and 
chaebols and began to permit firms to form business groups by acquiring ownership rights in 
each other in early 1990s. In this way, the state reduced its own role and became a 
shareholder with limited liability and administrative power (Dong and Hu, 1995). The year 
1986 saw 1,630 state-owned business groups booming across the country (Ma and Lu, 2005). 
In 2005, after restructuring, there were 1,446 state-owned groups in China.  
In recent years, the number of family-owned business groups increased markedly 
from 441 in 1997 to 1,138 in 2005, accounting for 40% of the total number of business 
groups. The sales revenue of family-owned business groups accounted for 29% of the total 
sales of all groups in 2005, which was a 17% increase from 1997. For instance, the largest 
private group in China during the 1990s, the Hope Group, has its origin from private farming. 
For another example, one of the largest high-tech non-state-owned business groups, the 
Lenovo group, was established by a few scientists and engineers in  the mid-1980s.  
Secondly, Chinese business groups are usually structured with a “parent” or “core” 
company, which acts as the headquarter on behalf of a controlling/dominant owner, such as 
the state. The core comapany is usually very powerful and the multi-layer structure allows it 
to control a large number of group affiliates in different industries or markets and expand 
quickly (Nolan, 2001; Fan, Wong, & Zhang, 2005; Li, Sun, & Liu, 2006). As a result, 
business groups achieve rapid growth through diversification for both state-owned and 
private-owned business groups. As Figure 1.1 shows, the business groups are not only 
diversified at the group level, namely, with child companies operating in multiple countries, 
but also diversified at the affiliate level, that is, with diversified grandchild companies. 
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The third characteristic of Chinese business groups is the foundation of a finance 
company. Group finance companies are responsible for managing cash flows among 
affiliated companies, allocating and redistributing funds or financing resources for new 
projects or acquisitions (Goto, 1982; Keister, 1998). In addition, another important function 
of finance companies is restructuring debts and arranging loans, credits, and stocks among 
affiliated companies themselves. They also coordinate the relationship between affiliated 
companies and external financial institutions, such as bank and investors. In particular, in a 
highly diversified business group, the role of a finance company could become more 
important because of its resource allocation and assets restructuring functions.  
1.5 Contributions 
This dissertation contributes to the literature in several ways. Firstly, this dissertation 
provides a fresh angle to understand the empirical puzzle why unrelated diversification 
strategy occurs at the group-affiliated firm level, despite that diversification at the business 
group level may be more effective. Recognizing the problems of information asymmetry and 
interest divergence between group-affiliated firms and their group headquarters, this study 
highlights the role of managers in group-affiliated firms and argues that they strategically 
choose unrelated diversification strategy to influence the group headquarters’ resource 
allocation decision and to protect the affiliated firm’s interest. This angle adds to the previous 
business group literature which stresses group headquarters’ ability in pooling, mobilizing 
and allocating resources, assuming the same interests between group headquarters and 
managers in group-affiliated firms or believes that the divergence can be solved by contract.   
Secondly, this study also extends the power-seeking perspective (Scharfstein & Stein, 
2000; Rajan, Servaes, & Zingales, 2000). The initial power-seeking framework (Rajan, et al., 
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2000) indicates that the diversity of resources and opportunities among divisions in a 
multidivisional diversified organization lead managers in divisions with more resources or 
opportunities to prefer “defensive investments” to investments that benefit the organization. 
The top management sees through the divisional managers’ incentives and therefore transfers 
resources from the more efficient divisions to the less efficient divisions. This process 
explains the “discount” in multidivisional diversified firms. In this study, I employ the 
theoretical perspective to business group context to understand the diversification moves in 
group-affiliated firms. Enriching the framework with elements from influence cost models 
(Meyer, Milgrom, and Roberts, 1992) and the behavior theory of firm (Bourgeois, 1981; 
Bourgeois & Singh, 1983; Cyert & March, 1963), I argue that affiliated firms’ managers 
have incentive to adopt “protective investment” that is not only “defensive” (protecting self-
generated resource slack) but also “preemptive” (competing for more group level resource 
slack). I identify unrelated diversification in affiliated firms as one type of such “protective 
investment”. Furthermore, highlighting the information asymmetry problem in a 
multidivisional organization, I argue that it is difficult for group headquarters to differentiate 
value-increasing investments from protective investments in group-affiliated firms. Therefore,  
the inefficiency of internal resource allocation within multidivisional organizations lies in the 
fact that group resources are transferred to less efficient projects, such as unrelated 
diversification, rather than to the less efficient divisions.  
Thirdly, by investigating the effect of different types of acquired excess 
resources/slack in diversification-performance relationship, I propose to consider the unequal 
market availability of resources in order to reconcile the seemingly contradict arguments of 
internal market efficiency theory and agency theory. On one hand, internal market efficiency 
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theorists have conceptualized business groups as responses to market imperfections (Leff, 
1976) and argued that group-affiliated firms may gain higher returns by acquiring and 
deploying resources from the business groups. On the other hand, the agency theorists 
emphasize the management entrenchment impact in diversification strategies, arguing that 
excess resources injected from business groups may exacerbate this problem by promoting 
undisciplined investments, encouraging the pursuit of pet projects (Nohria and Gulati, 1996), 
or rendering the management of the affiliated companies less diligent in their pursuit of 
efficiencies (Hundley and Jacobson, 1998). In this dissertation, I differentiate the market 
availability of resources and argue that acquiring market unavailable redeployable resources 
do help the performance of strategic moves in group-affiliated firms, while acquiring market 
available redeployable resources is more likely to exacerbate the agency problems and lead 
to inefficient strategic moves.  
Fourthly, extending the literature on corporate governance by integrating identity 
theory and social identity theory from sociological psychology, this study also contributes to 
the board literature by explaining how the contextual and reflexive factors affect the salience 
of multiple identities in group-affiliated executive directors and therefore determine their 
control role or resource role in protective investment decisions. This effort is a response to 
the calls for more in-depth examination of both directors as individuals and the antecedents 
of board effectiveness (Finkelstein, and Hambrick, 1996; Hillman et al., 2008). 
Lastly, this study adds to the literature on board of directors by investigating the role 
of board of directors in strategic interference in firms with controlling group shareholders. 
Recent research suggests that a firm’s board of directors affects its strategies (see Pugliese et 
al., 2009 for a review). Focused on large firms with disperse ownership, this work classified 
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the directors based on their independence from management (Hillman et al., 2000). This 




CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW  
2.1 Theories of Business Groups 
Business group is an intermediate case between firms and markets. When an owner 
owns a firm, this owner has the residual control rights over the use of assets of the firm 
(Grossman and Hart, 1986). Similarly, a business group as a collection of legally distinct 
firms that are partly or wholly owned and controlled by an individual or a group of 
individuals has right over the use of assets of the member firms. The owner of the group has 
the right to transfer assets across the member firms, hence establishing an internal market 
within a group. What makes a business group different from a diversified firm is that the 
right over the use of assets is limited because each member firm in a group is distinct by law. 
The existing work on business groups in emerging markets falls broadly into several streams 
of views: the internal market efficiency theory (Khanna and Palepu, 1997, 2000) arguing 
business groups in developing countries mimic the beneficial functions of market 
mechanisms that are present only in advanced economies; the tunneling theory within agency 
theory framework stressing issues related to pyramid structure and separation of cash flow 
rights and control rights in business groups; resource-based view (Guillen, 2000) 
emphasizing the generic capability of business groups in combining the requisite foreign and 
domestic resources for repeated industry entry; political perspective (e.g. Mahmood & Rufin, 
2005) stressing the government’s role in creation and development of business groups;  and 
the network perspective (Chung, 2005) looking at factors at the human agency and 
organization level. Below, I review each stream of literature of business groups in detail. 
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2.1.1 The Internal Market Efficiency Theory  
 When a particular market mechanism is under-developed or not accessible, a business 
group can add value by providing its affiliates with alternative means of overcoming 
problems (Bae, Kang, & Kim, 2002). This line of work conceptualizes groups as responses to 
market imperfections. Earlier studies along this line, firstly, emphasized on capital market 
imperfections, arguing that business groups provide their member firms preferential access to 
capital (e.g. Aoki, 1990; Shin and Park, 1999; Khanna and Yafeh, 2005). Some groups 
possess a core firm that makes and receives loans and offers credit to affiliated firms thus 
performing a role resembling that of a bank or venture capitalist (Almeida & Wolfenzon, 
2006). The main banks in keiretsu aid the member firms in financing both short-term projects 
and activities with more long-term objectives such as research and development (Miyashita 
and Russell 1994).  This insider lending appears to substitute for a formal financial system 
and to grant firms access to otherwise scarce capital where markets are inadequate at 
allocating funds (Goto 1982). Such informal financing arrangements allocate funds to the 
highest return uses within a group, provide opportunities for diversification, and allow firms 
to engage in otherwise unaffordable activities (Keister, 1998). Insider lending can mitigate 
certain informational asymmetries and reduce transaction costs, allowing firms to gain 
control over their environments. In addition to the operation of internal capital allocation, 
business groups are also likely to enjoy preferential access to credit than independent firms. 
Lee (2008) investigates the political relationship between power elites and business groups 
and how it changed group level borrowings. By constructing a measure of political ties using 
biographical data on high school, college and regional ties, the author finds that the group 
level short-term borrowing is higher for those business groups with tight political ties in the 
crisis era in Korea, and decreased substantially after the crisis. Thus Lee concludes that 
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political ties of the business groups played a significant role in their external funding, 
especially during credit crunch period.  Further, business groups have easier access to other 
sources of financing including bond financing than independent firms. Therefore, when the 
volume of bank credit decreases on an overall economy level, business groups are less 
affected than independent firms (Borensztein and Lee, 2002).  
 Secondly, business groups can alleviate failures in other markets. Affiliates within the 
same business group share intangible resources, such as technology, group-wide advertising 
and reputation. Such intangible assets do not depreciate in value with increased uses, 
encouraging diversification and large scope of economies. Kim (1996) illustrated that group-
level R&D activities were the sources of competitive advantage in several leading industries 
in Korea, such as automobiles, electronics, and semiconductors. Examining the profitability 
of group-affiliated companies in Korea, Chang and Hong (2000) find evidence that the 
group-affiliated firms benefit from sharing intangible resources with other member firms.  
Thirdly, business groups cultivate scarce human capital for their affiliates (Leff, 
1978). In emerging markets where the institutions to supply high-quality executive talent are 
underdeveloped, large business groups can develop a pool of specialized management 
efficiently and dispatch them to affiliated firms that may have difficulty finding executive 
talent in the market (Khanna and Palepu, 1997). For example, in Japan and Korea, business 
groups dispatch senior management to assist affiliates in specific projects such as business 
turnaround, new venture start-up, or foreign market entry (Gerlach, 1992).  
 Fourthly, business group structure represents an effective corporate governance 
structure that can mitigate incentive, information, and control problems associated with 
agency conflicts (Kim, Hoskisson, & Wan, 2004). For example, in Japan, the main bank is 
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typically the largest lender and holds a substantial equity stake in group members. It thus has 
a strong incentive to monitor the group members closely to safeguard its own interests as 
both a lender and an equity holder, hence enforcing internal discipline as well as protecting 
other financial stakeholders (Berglof and Perotti, 1994). When an affiliate is in financial 
distress, the main bank along with key shareholder affiliates have the ability to compel the 
managers of the troubled firm to take necessary actions or to lead restructuring efforts, 
including dispatching new directors to and replacing top managers of the firm (Pascale and 
Rohlen, 1983; Sheard, 1994). Despite an inactive external market for corporate control in 
Japan (Kester, 1990), the business group system has an effective internal control mechanism 
in place to enforce ex-post punishment of opportunistic or incompetent managers among 
business group affiliates. To the extent that affiliates’ managers are concerned with the 
potential consequences of managerial opportunism, the collective enforcement mechanism 
may also serve as a credible ex-ante corporate governance mechanism to thwart such 
behaviors.  
 Fifthly, the interlocking system within business groups may reduce informational 
asymmetries by facilitating the information flow (Haunschild 1993, 1994; Powell and 
Brantley 1992), or facilitate the diffusion of business practices (Rogers 1995, Davis and 
Powell 1992; Useem 1984) among group affiliates. Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) 
find empirical evidence to support this point. Comparing the investment sensitivity to 
internal liquidity in keiretsu firms and independent firms, they find that Japanese main banks 
mitigate information problems in Keiretsu firms. Based on previous studies’ prediction that 
liquidity is irrelevant when there are no information problem, they find that keiretsu firms 
which have closer bank ties show less sensitivity to liquidity than independent firms.   
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In addition, business groups provide a risk-sharing mechanism for affiliates (Nakatani, 
1984; Sheard, 1994). As such, business group affiliates utilize interlocking shareholdings and 
other stable inter-firm linkages to insulate themselves from market forces. This mechanism 
provides a rationale why affiliates remain committed to business group affiliation. When a 
member is in financial distress, for instance, the group usually arranges a collective or group-
wide rescue operation. Several examples were observed during the Asian Financial Crisis of 
1997 and 1998. The chairman of Samsung Electronics and head of the family that controls 
Samsung Group, Lee Kun Hee, donated his personal wealth to serve the debts of Samsung 
Motors Inc, a group affiliated firm near bankruptcy in 1999. The controlling shareholders in 
CP Group sold its overseas assets to raise money to rescue its publicly listed Thai companies. 
The Salim group also sold its privately held overseas assets in order to bail out its publicly-
listed affiliates in both the Philippines and Indonesia; it also moved funds from a publicly 
listed Hong Kong company to help the operations of a publicly listed Indonesian company. 
Gopalan, Nanda and Seru (2007) document that Indian business groups are characterized by 
intra-group loans as a way of transferring cash across group firms to support financially 
weaker firms. They argue that business groups provide support to avoid negative spillovers to 
the rest of the group resulted from default by a group firm. They find evidence showing that 
when an affiliate filed for bankruptcy in a group, the other affiliates in the group face 
significant drops in external financing, investments and profits, and their bankruptcy 
probability increases. Xu and Zhang (2008) also find that in Japan’s context, there is a 
negative relationship between bankruptcy probability and the Keiretsu dependences.  
 Lastly, group affiliates and independent firms respond differently to environmental 
opportunities and threats. They found that, in nine French civil law countries in Latin 
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America and Europe, the environmental influence, such as change in country development, 
higher competition and deregulation, was moderated by business group structure. Compared 
to independent firms, group affiliates tend to involve more asset-restructuring along with 
country development, while they are likely to be associated with less asset restructuring in 
presence of higher competition and deregulation. Lu and Ma (2008) show that local partner’s 
affiliation to a business group can replace the institutional voids through transacting 
internally and bringing political capital to the partner of an international joint venture and 
thus enhance its performance. In particular, a local partner’s affiliation enhances the 
performance of the IJV when facing local restriction on foreign direct investment (FDI), 
while affiliation to a national business group enhances the performance of an IJV in an FDI-
restricted industry. Tracking down the entry and exit of affiliates of a business group, Lee 
(2008) finds that expanding group level production portfolio can improve the immunity of 
the business groups from adverse macroeconomic shocks. Since exogenous shock affects 
industrial sectors asymmetrically, business groups with greater capability to switch products 
to the less susceptible sectors are more resilient in such outside shocks. The author shows 
that business groups add new products to the sectors in which they are not previously 
engaged in, experience less financial distress as much as 33 percent during the financial crisis. 
Thus, large diversified business groups are more likely to survive through product switching 
during extraordinary outside shocks, compared to independent firms (Lee, 2008).  





Table 2.1 The Internal Market Efficiency of Business Groups 
Institutional 
Dimension 




Venture capitalists, banks, 
private equity providers , 
mutual fund, auditor 
Keister, 1998; Chang 
and Hong, 2000 
Labor market 
Management institute/business 
school, certification agency, 
head-hunting firm, relocation 
service 






Lee, 2008; Mahmood 
and Mitchell, 2004 
Institutional change or 
restriction Moderators 
Hoskisson et al. 2004; 
Lu and Ma, 2008; Luo 
and Chung, 2005 
Contract enforcement Courts, extrajudicial arbitration service 
 
Governance system 
As large creditor and 
shareholder , compel 
incompetent managers 
Keister, 1998; Kim, 
Hoskisson, & Wan, 
2004 
Risk-sharing system Collective rescue operation in financial distress 
Nakatani, 1990; 
Sheard, 1994;  
Gopalan, Nanda and 
Seru, 2007; 
Xu and Zhang, 2009 
Note: adapted from Khanna and Palepu (1997) 
Recent studies document the disappearing of internal capital markets in business groups. 
Lee, Park and Shin (2009) find that active internal capital markets within Korean chaebols 
relieve the financial constraints of the group-affiliated firms, allowing them to make efficient 
capital allocations during the early 1990s. As the Asian financial crisis unfolded, however, 
Korean government implemented major structure reforms on chaebols and required them to 
reduce debt level, which drove the chaebol firms to rely more on public debt markets instead 
of internal capital markets. Similarly, Borensztein and Lee (2002) analyze the changes in the 
allocation of bank loans in the post-crisis period in chaebol firms. They find that the crisis 
forced financial institutions to become more market-based in terms of credit appraisal and 
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loan allocation. As a result, chaebol firms gradually lost their preferential access to loans that 
they enjoyed in the pre-crisis period and are subject to more stringent profitability tests in 
order to obtain bank loans.  
2.1.2 The Tunneling View of Business Groups 
One of the main ideas in the tunneling view is that business groups are associated 
with (legal or illegal) minority shareholder expropriation. The insight steams from Johnson et 
al (2000)’s tunneling view. Shareholders incur agency costs in emerging economies resulting 
not only from management’s shirking and perquisite consumption (Berle and Means, 1932), 
but also from controlling shareholders’ expropriation of minority shareholders (Claessens et 
al., 2000; La Porta, et al., 1999). The agency problem between controlling and minority 
shareholders can be particularly severe in the presence of business groups because the 
pyramid group structure is complex and less transparent. It is more difficult for minority 
shareholders to determine where control resides in an affiliate. It is also hard to identify and 
challenge unfair intra-group transactions (Chang, 2003) since such networks provide 
significant opportunity for collusion or other unethical transactions (Hoskisson et al., 2000). 
In short, business group affiliation provides a means by which controlling shareholders can 
expand control and thus increases the likelihood of expropriation of minority shareholders. 
There is increasing evidence showing,  indirectly or directly, the existence of tunneling. 
 Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan (2002) examine tunneling in pyramidal ownership 
structures of Indian business groups. They show that the ultimate owners of business groups 
have strong incentives to divert resources from firms that are low in the pyramid toward ones 
that are high in the pyramid. Similarly, Bae, Kang, and Kim (2002) find that when chaebol 
firms make acquisitions, their stock prices on average fall. They conclude that when a 
chaebol makes an acquisition, the minority shareholders of chaebol firms lose. In contrast, 
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the controlling shareholders gain in such an acquisition, because it enhances the value of 
other firms in the group. This provides empirical evidence to the tunneling view. Chang 
(2003) provide evidence that controlling shareholders in Korean Chaebol firms use insider 
information to take direct and indirect equity stakes in profitable or promising firms, then 
transfer profits to other member firms through related party transactions. Kim, Jung and Kim 
(2005) find that during financial crisis periods, funds simply move toward the firms where 
controlling shareholders have high cash flow rights. They conclude that ownership structure 
distorts the allocation of internal funds in such a way as to benefit the controlling 
shareholders. Baek, Kang and Lee (2006) find that in the equity-linked private securities 
offerings, chaebol issuers involved intragroup deals set the prices to benefit their controlling 
shareholders. The authors also find that, compared with other types of issuers, chaebol 
issuers gain an 8.8% higher announcement return if they sell private securities at a premium 
to other member firms. These results showed that such offerings are used as a mechanism for 





Table 2.2 Evidence of Tunneling: Literature Review Summary 





Ultimate owners divert resources from firms low in the 
pyramid toward ones high in the pyramid.  
Bae, Kang, and 
Kim (2002) Korea 
When chaebol firms make acquisitions, their stock prices 
on average fall. The controlling shareholders benefit 
because the acquisition enhances the value of other firms 
in the group. 
Chang (2003) Korea 
Controlling shareholders in Korean Chaebol firms use 
insider information to take direct and indirect equity 
stakes in profitable or promising firms and transfer 
profits to affiliates through related party transactions. 
Kim, Jung and 
Kim (2005) Korea 
During the financial crisis period, funds simply move toward 
the firms where controlling shareholders have high cash flow 
rights.  
Baek, Kang and 
Lee (2006) Korea 
Equity-linked private securities offerings are used as a 
mechanism for tunneling among chaebol firms. 
2.1.3 Propping or Tunneling 
The above literature diverges on the functions of business groups: some researchers 
stressed their resource providing and risk-sharing functions, while others focused on issues 
related to tunneling resources by the major business group owners. Recently, there are a 
growing volumn of studies explaining this discrepancy.   
Friedman, Johnson and Mitton (2003) argue that the groups choose how much to 
expropriate, but they can also inject private cash today in order to preserve their options to 
expropriate and to obtain a legitimate share of profits tomorrow. They suggest that when 
there is a moderately bad shock, the group is likely to bail out its affiliate. However, the 
group will abandon the firm, taking the money and run when there is a very bad shock. In 
addition, because the funding source of the business groups cannot commit not to bail out 
firms, it is tempted to bail them out ex post; hence, this expectation induces inefficient 
behavior (Roland, 2000). In such a way, large business groups exhibit a form of the soft 
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budget constraint, which is usually associated with government-backed enterprises or bank-
supported firms (Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995). 
Dow and McGuire (2009) investigate the response of Japanese Keiretsu to the 
changing economic and regulatory climate and find evidence that during strong economic 
times, Keiretsu tunnel profits from more weakly affiliated firms, while propping weakly 
aligned firms during economic recession. They indicate that the strengthened degree of 
adhesion to the horizontal keiretsu of many affiliated firms is a response to tightening credit 
conditions and the affiliates are trying to access the internal capital market of the business 
group during these times.  
Kali and Sarkar (2005) further find that proppoing through profit transfers among 
firms within a group and better monitoring through group level directorial interlocks explains 
the higher marekt valuation of business group affiliated firms. The effect of propping and 
directorial interlocks on firm value depends on the equity stakes of the controlling 
shareholders. Propping appears to be the source of group affiliation benefits in firms with 
below median cash flow rights of the controlling shareholder, while director interlocks are 
the primary source of the group effect for firms where the controlling shareholders have 
above median cash flow rights. 
Ferris, Kim and Kitsabunnarat (2003) determine that the cost associated with chaebol 
membership exceed its benefits. They find that chabol firms suffer a value loss due to pursuit 
of profit stability rather than profit maximization, overinvestment in low performing 
industries, and cross-subsidizing the weker members of their group. Although chaebols firms 
enjoy lower tax burdens and have greater debt capacity, the value loss exceeds these benefits.  
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2.1.4 Resource-based Theory of Business Group 
The resource-based view of business groups developed by Guillen (2000) argues that 
business groups develop a generic capability of combining the requisite foreign and domestic 
resources for repeated industry entry. His main assumption is that entrepreneurs and firms in 
emerging economies create business groups if political-economic conditions allow them to 
acquire and maintain the capability of combining foreign and domestic resources-inputs, 
processes, and market access to repeatedly enter new industries. This capability for repeated 
industry entry consists of a bundle of skills that facilitate conducting feasibility studies, 
obtaining licenses from the state, arranging financial packages, securing technology and 
knowhow, setting up plants, hiring and training workforces, and establishing supply and 
distribution channels (Guillen, 2000). Moreover, this capability will sustain in emerging 
economies with asymmetric trade and investment conditions because they allow a few 
entrepreneurs and firms to develop this capability. 
2.1.5 The Political View of Business Groups 
 The political perspective stressed the role of governments in initial creation and 
development of business groups in emerging economies (Mahmood & Rufin, 2005). In Japan, 
Gerlach (1992) and Lincoln et al. (1998) suggest that institutional evolution had led to the 
rise of zaibatsu and the later transition to keiretsu. In Taiwan, Chung (2001) identifies 
institutional incentives such as tax reduction as the primary variable that led to the emergence 
of business groups.  In Korea, Kim (1997: 93) concludes that the state, globalization, and the 
legacy as Japanese colonial are the ascendance of chaebols. Governments also affect the size 
and structure of markets and ultimately influence the competitiveness of the business groups 
(Hillman & Keim, 1995). Through its political connections with different levels of 
government in an emerging economy, business groups acquire political capital. Such political 
34 
 
capital can give groups preference entry into restricted industries or geographic locations (Lu 
and Ma, 2008), access to critical resources, favorable policies, business licenses, local 
coordinated economic development, disputes resolutions, or preferred tax rate (Hill, 2002; 
Walder, 1995). Such political capital is unavailable to independent local firms (Evans, 1979; 
Peng et al., 2005). 
2.1.6 The Network Perspective of Business Groups 
 Scholars adopting a network perspective of business groups focus on answering 
questions like “who the entrepreneurs are” and “how they build their business groups” 
through collecting market information, acquiring technological know-how and mobilizing 
necessary resources. They shift the research focus from macro-level factors as market forces, 
state policies, and other political-economic conditions to micro factors at the human agency 
and organization level (Chung, 2005). Employing the concept of personal networks from the 
network perspective, scholars explain business groups in China (Kennedy, 1997), Taiwan 
(Hamilton and Kao, 1990; Numazaki, 1996), Hong Kong, and Southeast Asia (East Asia 
Analytical Unit, 1995). In Taiwan’s case, Hamilton (1997) and Hamilton and Kao (1990) 
argued that the decisions of diversification in Taiwan business groups in the initial stage were 
mainly driven by the consideration of maintaining the owners’ personal networks. Numazaki 
(1996) showed that personal connections were applied in most steps of the founding of a 
business group from raising capital to cultivating political connections and recruiting 
personnel. He concludes that personal connections serve as the “human foundation” of a 
large-scale business group.  
 Luo and Chung (2005) further differentiate different types of personal connections in 
business groups and investigate their impacts on group performance, particularly, during 
institutional transition. They propose that during the economic transition towards market 
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economy, family social ties provide informal norms, which strengthen the intermediation 
within business groups and thus improve the performance of business groups. Family 
relationships also reduce strategic restructuring and therefore benefit group performance. The 
authors also find that while market transition enhanced the benefits of family social 
relationships, it did not enhance the benefits of common-identity relationships.  Moreover, 
family ties’ benefit is not linear, but rather diminishing after a threshold, indicating possible 
informational disadvantages and a legitimacy discount from foreign investors’ perspective.  
 Kock and Guillen (2001) propose a 3-stage theoretical model of the growth of 
business groups, by combining resource-based view and network perspective. In the first 
stage, in a market where regulations were stringent and market competition was limited, the 
connections of the founding families were essential resources for the growth of the groups. 
Access to technical know-how, licenses and contracts through connections with foreign 
sources and domestic regulators grants business groups competitive capabilities. Since such 
networking capability is generic, groups were able to use them to enter different industries 
subsequently. In the second stage with higher market competition, more groups developed 
the networking capabilities. The benefit of such capabilities gradually diminished and the 
groups faced market pressure to improve efficiency and profitability (Amsden and Hikino 
1994). At the final stage, when groups continued to learn, the competitive advantage moved 
toward innovation, and the diversification of business groups are more related and vertically 
integrated. Following this stream, Chung (2005) further stresses the importance of networks 
and the contexts in which the entrepreneurial process is embedded. In Chung’s view, 
personal connections are not the ‘necessary and sufficient condition’ but only a necessary 
factor. Based on comparative case studies of 150 Taiwanese group founders, Chung located 
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several contingencies for network entrepreneurship such as entrepreneurs’ gender, education, 
temporal events and geographical settings. Chung’s longitudinal analysis of three groups in 
general provides support to Kock and Guillen’s model. More specifically, in a tightly 
controlled operation environment networks are influential in the growth of the groups. At this 
stage, the group’s capability to build networks with crucial foreign and domestic sources is 
the critical competitive advantage. As market institutions progressed, the benefits of 
networks declined. The core capabilities for competition changed to mass production and 
innovation.  
2.2 Theories of Diversification  
Diversification literature suggests that diversification has both value-enhancing and 
value-reducing effects. The potential benefits for a firm to operate in different industries 
include improved operating efficiency, greater market power advantages, greater ability to 
capture rents on scarce and firm-specific assets, enjoyment of internal capital market 
advantages, greater debt capacity, and lower taxes. The potential costs of diversification 
include the use of increased discretionary resources to undertake value-decreasing 
investments, cross-subsidies that allow poor divisions to drain resources from more efficient 
divisions, and misalignment of incentives between central and divisional managers. Below I 
review the two streams of studies on diversification respectively. 
2.2.1 The Efficiency View of Diversification 
The efficiency view of diversification draws on the literature of market power theory, 
resource-based view and transaction cost economics. The early literature on diversification 
based on the market power theory assert that diversified firms can employ a number of 
mechanisms to create and exploit market power advantages, which are largely unavailable to 
the more focused firms (Scherer, 1980).  
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2.2.1.1 Resource-based View  
Later studies on diversification focus on understanding the performance of diversified 
firms by investigating the plausibility of scale and scope economies. Edith Penrose’s (1959) 
classic Theory of the Growth of the Firm was probably the first systematic theory explaining 
the ex-ante  reasons why firms diversify, because before this book, the diversification was 
probably “the most inadequately treated” characteristic of business firms in economic 
analysis (Penrose, 1959:104). The fundamental concept in Penrose’s growth theory lies in 
“excess resources”: a pool of unused productive services, resources, and special knowledge, 
all of which will always be found within any firm. Firms gradually accumulate excess 
resources as a non-intended consequence of their normal operations. Tasks become 
routinized and this releases human resources, such as managerial resources; some physical 
resources are indivisible, which means that they may not be fully exploited in their present 
use. In principle, these resources could be traded over markets; however, the presence of 
transaction costs will often hinder trading excess resources. This is particularly likely to be 
the case if the resources are knowledge resources (Teece, 1980). Diversification thus is a way 
of capturing rents on these scarce, firm-specific assets whose services are difficult to sell in 
intermediate markets (Penrose, 1959; Teece, 1980, 1982;  Wernerfelt, 1984).  
2.2.1.2 Efficient Internal Capital Market Perspective 
Focusing on diversification creating an internal market, a stream of literature in 
Finance provides theory and evidence to that diversification creates value to firms. 
According to Alchian (1969), a key advantage of an efficiency of internal capital market is 
that it better shields investment projects from the information and incentive problems than 
external finance. In General electric’s case, Alchian finds that GE “operates with greater 
speed to clear the market”, and “make the information more available to both lenders and 
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borrowers than the external market”. Weston (1970) states that resource allocation is more 
efficient in internal than in external capital markets. He contends that diversified firms 
allocate resources more efficiently because they create a larger internal capital market. Stulz 
(1990) supports this argument and finds that in diversified firms, the underinvestment 
problem described by Myers (1977) was attenuated in a larger internal capital market. 
Gertner, Scharfstein and Stein (1994) further elaborate the reason why corporate 
headquarters do a better job than external lenders, say, a bank, is because the residual control 
rights residing with the headquarters increase their incentive to monitoring, reduces managers’ 
entrepreneurial incentives, and makes it easier to efficiently redeploy the assets of projects 
that are performing poorly under existing management. Stein (1997) argues that the 
allocation of capital within a diversified firm can create value if funds are diverted to 
business segments rich in investment opportunities but lacking sufficient self-generated funds. 
Khanna and Tice (2001) provide evidence that in related diversified firms, internal capital 
markets function well, as transfers are away from the worsening divisions. They argue that 
the reasons why related diversification may be efficient are (1) in firms diversified into 
related business, the headquarters have better information about the investment opportunities 
across divisions and thus can make better “winner picking” decisions; (2) less information 
asymmetry in such firms also enable the headquarters to better judge the relative 
performance of the difference divisions and thus better align the incentives with performance; 
(3) managers working on related divisions are likely to be transferred which make managers 
more likely to make decisions that increase firm value. Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) find 
that conglomerate firms’ resource allocation is generally efficient as they grow more in 
industries in which their plants are productive when that industry experiences a positive 
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demand shock and when their other segments experience a negative shock. Billett and Mauer 
(2003) find that financing constraints are the main determinants of the internal capital market 
and firm value relationship. Subsidies to small financially constrained segments, regardless 
of their relative investment opportunities are good or poor, significantly increase excess 
value. Transfers of resources from segments with good relative investment opportunities 
significantly decrease the excess value of a diversified firm.  
There is another recent study that provides evidence of a previously unexamined 
source of economic gains to diversification: the protection of shareholder wealth against 
expropriation by politicians and private litigants (Beneish, Jansen, Lewis, and Stuart, 2008). 
In the context of a politically regulated industry, the authors document that diversification 
brings positive abnormal returns to shareholders because it increases a firm’s political 
influence through broader geographic presence and also because it transforms excess 
financial assets into physical and intangible assets which avoid expropriation.        
2.2.2 The Inefficient View of Diversification 
A variety of empirical evidence lends support to the view that a policy of corporate 
diversification is typically value reducing, leading conglomerates to trade at a lower stock 
value than comparable portfolios of specialized firms and be dismantled systematically in 
1980s (Scharfsterin and Stein, 2000). Explanations for this underperformance focus on 
imperfect firm governance (agency theory), inefficient cross-subsidization (incorrect 
valuation of firm industry segments), or divisional managerial rent-seeking behaviors.  
2.2.2.1 Agency-based Perspective of Diversification  
 A number of studies draw on agency theory to explain why a firm’s managers may 
benefit from undertaking diversifications, even if shareholders do not. The central motives to 
increase diversification include managerial employment risk reduction and increased 
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executive compensation (Amihud & Lev, 1981).  Agency theorists (e.g. Jensen and Meckling, 
1976) have traditionally been concerned with the problem of the separation of the ownership 
of residual claims from the control of corporate decisions in large public traded corporations 
with diffuse ownership structures. Diversification may benefit managers because of the 
power and prestige associated with managing a larger firm (Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990), 
because managerial compensation is related to firm size (Jensen and Murphy, 1990), because 
diversification reduces the risk of managers’ undiversified personal portfolios (Amihud and 
Lev, 1981), or because diversification helps make the manager indispensable to the firm 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). As a result, managers may maintain a diversification strategy 
even if doing so may reduce shareholder wealth. Furthermore, under this hypothesis, 
managers will reduce diversification only if pressured to do so by internal or external 
monitoring mechanisms. Denis and his colleagues (1997) find that the level of diversification 
was negatively related to managerial equity ownership and to the equity ownership of outside 
blockholders. They also report that decreases in diversification are associated with external 
corporate control threats, financial distress, and management turnover. These findings 
suggest that agency problems are responsible for firms maintaining value-reducing 
diversification strategies. Agency problems may be especially prevalent when substantial 
free cash flow (Jensen, 1986) allows managers to finance acquisitions without the discipline 
of financial markets.  
2.2.2.2 Cross-subsidies and Overinvestment in Diversified Firms 
 Another line of argument of the diversification discount is that conglomerates do not, 
on average, have more free cash flow, but their internal capital markets are less efficient in 
allocating a given amount of resources than external capital markets. Conglomerates tend to 
engage in inefficient cross-subsidization, spending relatively too much in some divisions and 
41 
 
too little in others (Scharfstein and Stein, 2000). A large amount of studies document the 
evidence of cross-subsidization in diversified firms and show that capital allocation tends to 
be inefficient. Lang and Stulz (1994) show that the Tobin's q of diversified firms was 
significantly smaller than the q of matching portfolios of specialized firms during the 1980s. 
Comparing the sum of stand-alone values for individual business segments in a diversified 
firm to the firm’s actual value, Berger and Ofek (1995) find a 13% to 15% average value loss 
from diversification. Supporting the related-diversification hypothesis, they also find a 
smaller value loss when the segments of the diversified firms are in the same two-digit SIC 
code. The authors provide evidence that overinvestment and cross-subsidization lead to the 
value loss. Examining how different segments of the same oil firm reacted to the 1986 oil 
shock which reduced the company’s cash flow, Lamont (1997)’s finding that oil companies 
significantly reduced their nonoil investment in 1986 lends support to that diversified 
companies tend to subsidize and overinvest in poorly-performing segments. Shin and Stulz 
(1998) find evidence for an active internal capital market by showing that the investment by 
segments of highly diversified firms is less sensitive to their cash flow than the investment of 
comparable single-segment firms. However, they also show that this benefit of internal 
market is less than previous researchers expect. Moreover, they find that segments with 
better investment opportunities are not differentiated from other segments, which is 
consistent with “socialism” perspective in Scharfstein and Stein (1996). Scharfstein (1998) 
finds that divisions operating in industries with high Tobin’s q tend to invest less than their 
stand-alone industry peers, while divisions that operate in industries with low Tobin’s q tend 
to invest more than their stand-alone industry peers. This sort of "socialism" in capital 
allocation in which investment tends to get equalized across divisions is particularly 
42 
 
conspicuous in a conglomerate’s smaller divisions. The author argues that agency problems 
between corporate headquarters and investors are at the root of the inefficient cross-
subsidization problem by showing that the problem is more pronounced in firms in which 
management has small equity stakes. Bernardo, Luo and Wang (2006) also show that firms 
do not necessarily choose the highest quality project in the presence of agency and 
information problems. Instead, firms bias project choice toward the weak division.   
2.2.2.3 Internal Power Struggles and Resource Allocation in Diversified Firms 
 Though agency theory could explain generic overinvestment as an attempt by the 
CEO to entrench herself, it has limited explanation power on the internal misallocation of 
funds; the CEO should exploit all potential sources of value inside the firm, seeking agency 
rents from the overall pie (Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales, 2000). Accordingly, two recent 
models go a level deeper in the organization and focus on the role of rent-seeking activity by 
division managers. Scharfstein and Stein (2000) develop a two-tiered agency model in which 
inefficient division managers divert their time away from productive effort to enhance their 
outside options and increase their bargaining power when negotiating total compensation 
from the CEO. This model in some respects shared similar implications with the influence 
costs studies by Meyer, Milgrom, and Roberts (1992), which explains the very large volume 
of time-series variation in ownership of business divisions in reality. The key to Meyer et al’s 
explanation is the different prospects between growth and decline for divisions and the 
resulted additional influence costs. For example, the managers might exaggerate the 
division’s prospects in an attempt to gain access to corporate resources that can be used to 
prevent or delay the downsizing. Scharfstein and Stein push the question further and ask why 
the headquarters of the diversified firm not mitigate this problem through bribing the 
managers of inefficient divisions directly in return for their refraining from rent seeking. 
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Their arguments are because the CEO is herself an agent of outside shareholders. Therefore, 
the CEO may prefer diverting investment funds, which should be under the control of 
shareholders, toward the inefficient division to paying the division manager more cash using 
discretionary funds, which the CEO can control and potentially divert to herself.  
 Scharfstein and Stein’s work was the first to develop the rent-seeking model. Later 
work, for example Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000), criticizes Scharfstein and Stein’s 
rent-seeking model by arguing that CEOs would not prefer to misallocate potentially 
hundreds of millions of investment dollars in order to maintain discretion over a relatively 
small cash payment to the division manager. Instead, they analyze resource allocation in 
diversified firms and propose a power-seeking perspective. Their model’s two basic 
assumptions are: (1) limited power of a headquarter over its divisions; (2) negotiated surplus 
distribution among divisions. Based on these assumptions, the authors determine how “the 
power to take decisions, or capture surplus,” is distributed within the firm and thus to 
determine whether the internal capital market does a better job than the external one. They 
identify the diversity of investment opportunities and resources as the proxy for segment 
manager power. Division managers have autonomy to choose between an efficient 
investment and a defensive investment that protects their division’s surplus from being 
expropriated by other managers. Thus, though the efficient investment maximizes firm value, 
a divisional manager may prefer the defensive investment when the surplus created by its 
division is far more than that in other divisions. The firm can mitigate this inefficiency by 
diverting the capital allocation to the divisions with less resources and investing opportunities. 
 Bernardo, Luo and Wang (2006) pointed out that incomplete managerial incentive 
contracts made by the firm are the key feature in both Scharfstein and Stein (2000) and Rajan 
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et al. (2000) models. Bernardo et al argue that, even when the firm can write managerial 
compensation contracts, the firm will still bias its project selection policy against the strong 
division in the presence of agency and information problem. Their core argument is that the 
optimal compensation contracts should consist of more performance pay and less salary in 
order to induce truthful reporting of project quality by the managers. However, the cost of 
providing incentive pay while maintaining truthful reporting is increasing in the proportion of 
projects of higher quality, which results in lower incentive pay and lower managerial effort in 
the strong division. Thus, as project quality and managerial efforts jointly determine project 
cash flow, the strong division’s project needs to be of significantly higher quality to offset the 
lower managerial effort. In other words, Bernardo et al introduce the spread in managerial 
efforts resulted from the cost of writing more efficient compensation contract into the 
internal capital allocation scenarios and provide support to the inefficiency view.  
 The above studies are related to the literature that examines the agency and 
information problems in the capital budgeting process. Harris, Kriebel, and Raviv (1982) are 
the first to analyze intra-firm resource allocation in the presence of both information and 
incentive problems. The question they ask is “how should a firm allocate a resource among 
divisions when the productivity of the resource in each division is known only to the division 
manager?” They see that division managers have a preference for larger allocations because 
the resource could be substituted for costly managerial effort. They show that the optimal 
transfer price scheme in their setting is to allow division managers to choose price-quantity 
combinations from a menu of choices. Antle and Eppen (1985) show that in the presence of 
information asymmetry and moral hazard, organizational slack and resource rationing, the 
inefficiencies of organization, can occur even in an efficient organizational design. They 
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suggest that auditing and monitoring are substitutes for resource rationing, but both 
alternatives are costly.   
2.2.2.4 Criticism of inefficient internal market evidence 
  
 Villalonga (2000) and Whited (2001) argue that much of inefficient internal market 
evidence is misleading because of biased estimates of the investment opportunities of the 
business segments of diversified firms. Villalonga show that if this bias is corrected or if the 
firm’s activities are broken down into business units instead of Compustat segments, then the 
diversification discount reverts to a diversification premium. In addition, Chevalier (2000), 
Campa and Kedia (2002), and Hyland and Diltz (2002) argue that selection bias may explain 
the diversification discount and the evidence of inefficient cross-subsidies offered to explain 
it. In particular, Campa and Kedia and Hyland and Diltz find that diversified firms trade at a 
discount to their industry peers prior to becoming diversified, and Chevalier finds that the 
cross-subsidization patterns documented in the literature can be found among merger 
partners prior to merging.   
46 
 
Table 2.3 Methodology Review of Internal Capital Market Literature 
Author and concepts 
Shin and Park (1998), Shin and 
Stulz (1998) 
Lang and Stulz (1994), Scharfstein 
(1998), Rajan , Servaes and 
Zingales (2000) 




 Segment’s share of total assets  
-Cross-subsidy /Funds 
transfered  
Regress a segments’ capital 
expenditures on a proxy for the 
segment’s unobservable Q, the 
segments’ cash flow and other 
segments’ cash flow 
Difference between a segment’s 
capital expenditures and the 
average or median capital 
expenditures of single-segment 
same-industry firms. 
Subsidy: when Capex<ATCF 






 The difference between a 
segment’s asset-weighted average 
industry Q and the asset-weighted 
average of segment industry Qs for 
the firm. 
ROA-ROAremaining segments 
>0: efficient segment 




 s.d of segment asset-weighted 
fitted Qs divided by the equally 




 Sensitivity of a segment’s 
investment to its own cash flow. 
Probability of not paying 
dividend 
>0.5: not constrained 
<0.5: constrained 




 Excess-value: the difference 
between the market value of a 
diversified firm and a portfolio of 
single-segment firms in the same 
three-digit SIC code. 
 
Problems 
- Measurement error in Q will bias 
the coefficient estimates on the 
cash flow variables (White, 2001). 
- Assumes that the investment 
opportunities facing divisions of 
conglomerate firms are identical to 
-Non-dividend-paying firms are 
not necessarily face a larger cost 
of external financing than do 
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- Cash flow of other segments may 
be correlated with the investment 
opportunities of the investing 
segment (Chavalier, 2000). 
 
those of stand-alone firms in the 
same industry, which is not the 
case (Chavalier, 2000; Villalonga, 
2000, Campa and Kedia, 2002, and 
Hyland and Diltz, 2002). 
dividend-paying firms (Kaplan 





2.2.3 The Discrepancy between Efficiency and Inefficiency Arguments of Diversification 
The above reviewed two streams of literature on diversification can be further classified 
into two broad categories: one focus on the ex ante reasons for why firms diversify, while the 
other focus on ex post explanations for how diversification influence firm value (see Table 2.4). 
Looking closer at the two opposing views regarding why firms diversify, I note that despite their 
discrepancy, both views stress the concept of “excess resource”, or slack. Resource-based view 
stresses the importance of resource slack as a driver of diversification and argues that 
diversification is a way of capturing rents on the excess resources whose services are difficult to 
sell in intermediate markets (e.g. Penrose, 1959). They view high slack relaxes controls and 
represents funds whose use may be approved even in the face of uncertainty (Nohria an Gulati, 
1996). From this perspective, slack implies the ability to mobilize resources more readily or at 
lower cost from external agencies, such as providing reputation benefits and privileged access. In 
addition, slack allows the firms to interact or compete in its environment more boldly (Bourgeois, 
1981). As more slack supplied to the firms, they can afford to experiment with new strategies by, 
for example, introducing new products, entering new markets (Hambrick & Snow, 1977), or 
introducing innovations (Cyert and March, 1963). This perspective stresses ‘entrepreneurial 
ambition’ of the management in a firm facing “slack”.  ‘Entrepreneurial ambition’ of the top 
management team is management’s desire for growth and its propensity for taking risks to ensure 
that growth occurs (Penrose, 1959). This motivation of entrepreneurial management to transform 
slack resources into growth is rooted in the resource-based view (Mishina et al, 2004).  Highly 
ambitious managers will seek to extract growth from resources, and thus will drive down slack to 
minimal levels, preferring to invest such resources to expand a firm’s geographic market or 
product markets. For entrepreneurial managers, slack is ‘waste’, and they are sometimes even 
willing to endure short term deficits, or negative slack, in order to promote future growth (e.g., 
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Bhide, 1992). In contrast, agency theorists suggest that slack can facilitate suboptimal 
management behaviors (Jensen, 1986). Firstly, more resources at discretion may reduce the 
scrutiny of the top management in scanning and evaluating alternative strategic choices 
(Bourgeois, 1981), or allow them to pursue pet project that accord better with their own 
preference than with economic considerations (Child, 1972; Jensen, 1986). Furthermore, 
existence of slack can also promote political activities among subdivisions because self-
aggrandizing managers may engage in such behaviors in an effort to capture more than a fair 
share of resources, or new slack, from the system (Bourgeois, 1981).  
Regarding how diversification influences firm value, researchers also hold opposing 
views, debating on the efficiency of internal resource allocation. In the center of this debate is the 
information asymmetry and agency problem within a diversified firm. The proponents of 
efficiency of internal market stress the flexibility of moving funds and less informational 
asymmetry and less agency problem, in particular, in related diversified firms (Khanna and Tice, 
2001). In contrast, the proponents of inefficiency of internal resource allocation focus on the 
influence cost (Meyer et al., 1992), rent-seeking behavior of division managers (Scharfstein and 
Stein, 2000), or power-seeking investment decisions made by the division managers (Rajan et al., 
2000). These models, essentially, argue that the division managers have self interests which are 
diverse from each other and from headquarter. Thus divisional managers have two ways to 
protect their self interests: for divisional managers from divisions with poor growth prospects, 
they are likely to engage in rent-seeking behaviors to lobby for more resources allocated to their 
division (Meyer et al., 1992; Scharfstein and Stein, 2000). For divisional managers from stronger 
divisions with more resource and opportunities, they may prefer defensive investments at the 
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cost of lower returns that would benefit them more directly, especially when their resources and 
opportunities are much better than the other division’s.  
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Table 2.4 Summary of Diversification Literature 
 Ex ante reasons of diversification Ex post explanations of diversification 
Efficiency Inefficiency Efficiency Inefficiency 
Literature 
Penrose (1959), Teece 
(1980; 1982),  
Wernerfelt (1984) 
Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), Amihud and Lev 
(1981), Denis et al. (1997) 
Alchian (1969), Chandler 
(1977), Weston (1970), Stulz 
(1990), Gertner, Scharfstein and 
Stein (1994), Stein (1997), 
Khanna and Tice (2001), 
Maksimovic and Phillips 
(2002), Billett and Mauer 
(2003) 
Lang and Stulz (1994), Lamont 
(1997), Scharfstein (1998), Shin 
and Stulz (1998), Rajan, 
Servaes, and Zingales (2000), 
Gertner et al., (2002), Bernardo, 






Agency theory Operation efficiency; Internal 
capital market efficiency 
Cross-subsidies and 




Why do firms diversify? How does diversification influence firm value? 
Main 
Arguments 
Diversification is a way 
of capturing rents on 
scarce, firm-specific 
assets whose services are 
difficult to sell in 
intermediate markets. 




reduction and increased 
executive compensation. 
Coordination of specialized 
divisions; sharing of resources; 
synergy; dominant logic. 
Higher incentive to monitor, 
less entrepreneurial incentives, 
and easier to efficiently 
redeploy assets.   
Subsidize and overinvest in 
poorly-performing segments; 
socialism.  
Information asymmetry and 




Facing slack, managers 
show entrepreneurial 
ambition 
Facing slack (free cash 
flow), managers pursue 
perquisite and 
entrenchment 
Flexibility in moving funds, less 
information asymmetry, 
stronger control 
Presence of divergent interests 





2.3 Theories of Board of Directors 
Boards of directors play multiple, and critical roles in organizations. Existing literature has 
conceptualized that board of directors fulfill two roles in organizations. First, they link 
organizations to critical resources in the environment and to valuable information residing in a 
network of director interlocks (Zald, 1969; Pfeffer, 1972; Hillman, 2005).  Second, they play a 
role in administration and internal control, putatively responsible for setting policy and 
monitoring management (Zald, 1969; Fama and Jensen, 1983). The first role is based on resource 
dependence theory and the second is based on agency theory. For a long time, the two theories 
dominate every theoretical formulation involving boards of directors. Stewardship theory 
(Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Donaldson, 1990) challenges the behavior assumption in agency 
theory and proposes a “cooperative” view about the management and shareholder instead. 
Theorists in this stream stress a board structure that facilitates and empowers the management, 
rather than control and monitor them. In addition, several streams of research on governance 
recently emerged, taking a social psychological perspective to understand the behavior aspects of 
board of director (e.g., Golden-Biddle and Rao, 1997; Westphal, 1998; Westphal and 
Fredrickson, 2001; Hillman et al., 2008; Tuggle, et al., 2010). These studies underscore the 
importance of how context affects the behaviors of directors. Below I review the literature in 
detail.  
2.3.1 The Resource Dependence Perspective 
This resource dependence perspective is primarily concerned with the board’s function of 
providing resources that are broadly defined as anything strengthening the weakness of a firm 
(Wernerfelt, 1984: 172). The theoretical underpinning of this function is based on work on 
resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Pfeffer and Salancik note that “when 
53 
 
an organization appoints an individual to a board, it expects the individual will come to support 
the organization, will concern himself with its problems, will variably present it to others, and 
will try to aid it” (1978: 163). This literature suggests that boards provide four primary benefits: 
(1) advice and counsel in important firm decisions such as the formulation of strategy (Judge & 
Zeithaml, 1992; Lorsch & MacIver, 1989), (2) legitimacy, (3) information channels between 
external organizations and the firm (Burt, 1980; Hillman et al., 2001), and (4) preferential access 
to resources such as capital (Mizruchi & Stearns, 1988) or innovation (Haunschild & Beckman, 
1998).  
The resource dependence perspective contends that a board’s provision of resources has 
direct positive impact on firm performance. Resources help reduce dependency between the firm 
and external contingencies (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), help the firm deal with uncertainties 
(Pfeffer, 1972), lower its transaction costs (Williamson, 1984), and ultimately aid the firm in 
survival (Singh, House, & Tucker, 1986). 
2.3.2 The Agency Perspective 
Agency theory is the dominant approach to research on corporate governance and focus 
on the monitoring function of boards, or the “control” role (Boyd, 1990; Johnson, Daily, & 
Ellstrand, 1996; Mace, 1971; Pearce & Zahra, 1992; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). It holds that the  
problem of separation of ownership from management enables self-interested top managers, by 
virtue of their expertise and superior access to information, to misrepresent performance, 
misallocate resources, and engage in self-dealing at the expense of shareholders (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). In the agency framework, the establishment of an independent board of 
directors consisting of legal outsiders is one of three major mechanisms (along with incentive 
schemes and the external takeover market) that exist to ensure alignment between the interests of 
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managers and owners (Fama and Jensen 1983). The board of directors serves as a watchdog that 
seeks to minimize conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders; it monitors the CEO 
(Boyd, 1995; Daily, 1996), evaluates and rewards the CEO/top management of the firm, plans 
CEO succession (Pitcher, Chreim, & Kisfalvi, 2000), and monitors strategy implementation 
(Rindova, 1999). Board monitoring can reduce agency costs inherent in the separation of 
ownership and control and, as a result, improve firm performance (Fama, 1980; Mizruchi, 1983; 
Zahra & Pearce, 1989). 
Agency theorists argue that the primary precursor of the monitoring function is board 
incentives. They acknowledge that boards of directors have varied incentives to monitor to 
protect shareholder interests. When boards’ incentives are aligned with shareholders’ interests, 
they will be more effective monitors of management, and in this way, improve the firm 
performance (Fama, 1980; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Two prominent proxies for board 
incentives have been identified in agency theory research: board dependence and director 
compensation. Agency theorists in general prefer boards dominated by independent outside 
directors (Barnhart, Marr, & Rosenstein, 1994; Baysinger & Butler, 1985; Daily, 1995; Daily & 
Dalton, 1994; Weisbach, 1988). They contend that boards consisting primarily of executive 
directors (current or former managers/employees of the firm) or those non-executive directors 
who have business dealings, family or social relationships with current management or the firm 
have less incentive to monitor management, due to their dependence on the CEO/organization. 
The theoretical hypothesis of this research predicts dependent boards will be less effective 
monitors and negatively associated with firm performance. The empirical research testing this 
hypothesis, however, has been mixed. A recent meta-analysis of fifty-four studies of board 
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dependence shows no significant statistical relationship between this proxy of board incentives to 
monitor and firm performance (Dalton et al., 1998). 
Another antecedent of boards’ incentives to monitor is equity compensation (Jensen, 
1993). Equity compensation aligns the interests of directors with that of shareholders, thus 
motivating boards of directors to be more vigilant monitors (Elson, 1995). When boards share 
the benefits of better equity performance of the company, their incentives to pursue shareholder 
interests are stronger (Dalton et al., 2003). Research in this area suggests that board equity 
compensation will be positively associated with monitoring and firm performance. The statistical 
evidence to support this hypothesis, however, has also been inconclusive based on a recent meta-
analysis (Dalton et al., 2003). 
2.3.3 Stewardship Theory 
 Agency theory is fundamentally a theory of self-interest and enforced compliance 
(Perrow, 1986; Donaldson, 1990). It assumes that individuals weigh more of the utility of greater 
personal wealth, status, leisure, etc. and engage in actions that benefit their own interests.  In 
contrast, stewardship theory, rooted in psychology and sociology, holds a less self-centered, 
more cooperative view of behavior of managers and argues that many managers are stewards 
whose motives are largely aligned with the objectives of their principals (Donaldson, 1990). 
According to this theory, a steward perceives pro-organizational, cooperative behaviors with 
higher utility than individualistic behaviors. Thus, a steward maximizes their own utility function 
through protecting and maximizing shareholders’ wealth. Stewardship theorists focus on 
governance mechanisms that designed to empower managers and promote their voluntary 
coordination rather than those to monitor and control managers (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; 
Donaldson, 1990). In contrast to the opponents of agency theory, stewardship theorists argue that 
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a board structure with CEO assuming the chair of board can empower the CEO to determine 
strategy and ensure him to be responsible for the fate of the corporation, without fear of 
countermand by an outside chair of the board. They suggest that separating the two roles of CEO 
and board chair may create conflict or power struggles among corporate leaders as well as 
confusion about corporate objectives and expectations (Baglia et al., 1996). In particular, when a 
company has to overcome a crisis, which requires fast decisions and clear strategic orientation, 
the advantages of clear leadership might be most valuable (Mueller and Baker, 1997). Further, 
stewardship theorists suggest that when steward managers are controlled by principals as if they 
were opportunistic agents, they will feel frustrated and may not be able to develop effective, 
cooperative working relationship with principals (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997). 
Finally, stewardship theorists point out that their benign view of the shareholder-manager 
relationship is not applicable in all circumstances. They admit that in threatening events such as 
takeover attempts that break the natural bond between managers and shareholders, agency theory 
has better explanation power. Thus stewardship theory offers a context-specific complementary 
theoretical perspective to the agency theory on corporate governance (Lane et al., 1998).   
2.3.4 A Multi-theoretical View of Board 
In order to resolve the divergent views held by multiple theories, recent studies make 
efforts to develop a multi-theoretical view of board. For example, Shen (2003) proposes an 
evolutionary perspective and provides a potential resolution to the debate between agency theory 
proponents and stewardship theory proponents. The author suggests that board needs to focus on 
CEO leadership development in early CEO tenure, but to shift toward the control of managerial 
opportunism as CEOs prove their leadership on the job. During the early years of CEO tenure, 
the CEOs need to further develop their leadership to meet the demands of their new jobs, and 
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their relatively weak power position and vulnerability will help deter these new CEOs from 
pursuing personal interests. The problem of managerial opportunism is most likely to occur after 
CEOs have proven their leadership on the job. The significant increase in power not only gives 
CEOs discretion to pursue personal interests but also make them more entrenched in their 
position. The control-focused approach of governance proposed in agency theory may be 
appropriate only after CEOs have proven their leadership in office.   
Lynall, Golden and Hillman (2003) contend that the predictive power of the alternative 
theories is contingent upon the life cycle stage at formation and the relative power of important 
stakeholders. A firm’s resource needs, sophistication and complexity of systems and structures, 
and managerial capabilities are different across its life cycle stages. Specifically, during the 
entrepreneurial stage of the life cycle when the management authority is at risk, the CEO and 
external financier will turn to their social network for directors. In both the collectivity and 
formalization and control stages of the organizational life cycle, when CEOs have dominant 
power, they are more likely to recognize board as a potential asset in securing resources and 
reducing uncertainties. Thus, resource dependence theory is more helpful to explain board 
composition in this situation. In contrast, if financiers have relative power, institutional theory 
will be particularly applicable to board formation (i.e. establish legitimacy in external 
environment) in the collectivity stage. Also, if financiers have relative power, as the scale and 
complexity of the business increase, as in the formalization and control stage, there will be 
greater incentives for board monitoring (agency theory dominates).  
2.3.5 Social Psychological and Sociopolitical Perspectives 
In recent years, organizational sociologists have critiqued that the agency model of 
boards is limited because it overlooks how boards are embedded in structural, political, cognitive 
58 
 
and cultural contexts (Granovetter 1985; Hirsch et al. 1987; Zukin and DiMaggio 1991; Golden-
Biddle and Rao, 1997). This stream of research emphasizes that the functioning of a board is 
contingent on contextual factors, such as director interlocks (Davis 1991), political struggles 
between business and non-business organizations (Roe, 1991), structured regularities of mental 
process (Staw and Ross, 1987) or organizational culture (Golden-Biddle and Rao, 1997).  
One main theme of studies in this tradition is to understand how boards participate in 
strategic decision making as an active part of it (Stiles and Taylor, 1996). Jensen and Zajac (2004) 
and Useem and Zelleke (2006) highlight that boards participate in these processes through 
continuously interacting with managers and/or other stakeholders. Golden and Zajac (2001) 
investigate the demographic and processual profile of boards on strategic change. They suggest 
that the effect of demography, for example board tenure, on strategic change is likely to be 
curvilinear, which help reconcile some of the conflicting findings in prior top management team 
and group literature. Specifically, board with low tenure would have much less rich information 
based on which to suggest strategic change, while boards with very high tenure are likely to be 
more rigid and committed to established practices and procedures. In addition, they propose that 
the demographic and processual features of boards interact with a board’s power to affect change, 
having a stronger impact on strategic change when boards are more powerful. 
Carpenter and Westphal (2001) develop a sociocognitive perspective on how 
appointments to other boards affect the capability of directors of a firm to monitor and advise its 
management in the strategic decision making process. This perspective suggests the importance 
of directors’ networks of appointments to other boards in determining whether they have the 
appropriate strategic knowledge and perspective to monitor and advise management. The authors 
find that in a stable operating environment, appointments to the boards of other firms that are 
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strategically related to the focal firm provide directors with relevant strategic knowledge and 
perspective and increase the level of board monitoring and advice interaction on strategic issues. 
In contrast, in a unstable operating environment, appointments to the boards of other firms that 
are heterogeneous in their strategic relatedness to the focal firm can bring in higher level of 
board capability in monitoring and advice interactions. They conclude that the strategic context 
of social network ties, not the simple number of ties, is an important influence on corporate 
governance. 
Westphal (1999) draws on the literature in advice seeking and social ties in organization 
and considers how social factors such as trust and perceived social obligations in CEO-board 
relationship may promote rather than hinder board involvement and effectiveness in strategy-
making process. Apart from the dominant view of how a lack of board social independence from 
management affects a board’s contribution to strategic decision making, Westphal’s study 
proposes a “collaborative board model”. It shows that a lack of social independence of board, i.e. 
the friendship ties between a CEO and a board or director appointment by a CEO, can increase 
board involvement and firm performance by raising the frequency of advice and counsel 
interactions between CEOs and outside directors. Personal relationship can alleviate impression 
management concerns, such as the fear of appearing uncertain or dependent, and concerns about 
revealing sensitive information, especially when the colleagues are in a position to evaluate the 
advice seekers’ performance.  
Several studies, based on the social psychology approach, find evidence that the power of 
CEOs restrict the boards to play an active role in shaping the organization’s strategy. Westphal 
and Zajac (1995) show that, in the new director selection process, CEO and existing board 
members tend to support new directors with demographic similarity with them. The relative 
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power of CEOs and boards predicts which part is more likely to realize his preferences. This is 
because that people develop self-esteem and self-identity from perceived group membership and 
demographic similarity enforces such group membership (Tsui, Egan, and O’Reilly, 1992). In 
addition, CEOs may find it easier to interact and communicate with board that is characterized 
with compatible leadership and communication styles (Wagner, Pfeffer, and O’Reilly, 1984; 
O’Reilly, Caldwell, and Barnett, 1989). The authors also find that higher demographic similarity 
between CEOs and the board result in higher CEO compensation. In their additional post hoc 
analysis, the researchers find a strong general correspondence between the characteristics of 
incumbent CEOs and those of new directors. This shows that the appointment of new directors 
may typically promote CEO entrenchment rather than board control. In a similar vein, Zajac and 
Westphal (1996) show that powerful top managers attempt to maintain their control by selecting 
and retaining board members with experience on other passive boards and excluding individuals 
with experience on more active boards.   
Golden-Biddle and Rao (1997) takes a fresh look at the board governance and shows how 
organizational identity influences the construction and enactment of the director’s role and 
shapes interactions among board of directors and managers. Organizational identity is defined as 
the members’ shared beliefs about the central, enduring, and distinctive characteristics of the 
organization. The scholars study the role of directors in a nonprofit organization where directors 
see themselves as vigilant monitors and as friendly, supportive colleagues to the management. 
Thus they introduce the idea of “conflict of commitment,” a form of intra-role conflict. When 
managerial breaching actions occur, the directors are in face of a dilemma of upholding one 
dimension of identity while undermining the other.  In a similar vein, Hillman, Nicholson and 
Shropshire (2008) integrate identity theory and social identity theory research with literature on 
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board monitoring and resource provision, and argue that directors’ multiple identities (e.g., 
parent, teacher, chairman; nationality, ethnicity, gender, political affiliation) shape their behavior. 
In particular, the authors suggest that directors with multiple identities will have response 
flexibility in a complex and ambiguous situation. Multiple identities also give individual 
directors advantages like overall status security, enrichment of personality, and ego gratification.  
Moreover, the authors argue that not only the presence of directors’ multiple identities affect 
behavior, the strength of identification with each also matters. They identify identification with 
the organization (e.g. tenure), being a director (e.g. professional director), being a CEO, with 






Table 2.5 Theoretical Perspectives on Boards of Directors 
Dimension Resource Dependence Agency Theory Stewardship Approach A Multi-theoretical View 
Theoretical 
Origins 
Organizational Theory & 
Sociology Economics & Finance Psychology and Sociology Evolutionary theory 
Behavioral 
Assumptions 
 Individualists Collectivist  
Behavior 
Tendencies 
 Opportunism Cooperation Both opportunism and cooperation 
Board role Resource providing Control and monitor Service and advice 
(1) Early CEO tenure: 
develop CEO leadership,  
Later CEO tenure: control; 
(2) Entrepreneurial stage: 
resource role; 





Goal alignment Goal conflict Goal alignment 
 
 Board 
Structure  Stress director interlocks 
Outsiders 
Non-duality 
Insiders, Social ties, and 
CEO duality 
e.g. Early CEO tenure: 
CEO duality,  




Daily & Dalton (1994a,b); 
Gales & Kesner (1994); 
Hillman, Cannella, & 
Paetzold (2000); Pfeffer 
(1972); Pfeffer & Salancik 
(1978) 
Mace (1971); Zahra & 
Pearce (1989); Boyd 
(1990); Pearce & Zahra 
(1992); Johnson, Daily, & 
Ellstrand (1996)  
Davis, Schoorman, & 
Donaldson (1997) 
Shen (2003); Lynall, 




































Strong association between prior 
performance and the probability of a 
resignation for companies with 
outsider-dominated boards.  
The monitoring effect of the 
outsider board is not a function of the 
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When CEO nears retirement, 
firms tend to add inside directors as 
possible candidates to be the next 
CEO. 
Just after a CEO change, inside 
director with short tenures appear more 
likely to leave the board. 
Inside directors are more likely to 
leave the board and outside directors 
are more likely to join after a firm 
performs poorly and when a firm 
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Bidding firms on which 
independent outside directors hold at 
least 50% of the seats have 
significantly higher abnormal returns 
than other bidders. 
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return at the 
poison-pill 
announcement 





Stock market reaction to 
announcements of poison pills is 
positive when the board has a majority 
of outside directors and negative when 
it does not. 
The results are driven by directors 
who are retired executives from other 
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Boards influence firms either 
through strategic controls or through 
financial mechanisms.  
More non-executive directors and 
outside board member equity were 
positively related to the involvement of 
the board on restructuring decisions. 
TMT equity, use of strategic 
controls, tenure, organization tenure, 
and education level were all negatively 





















A firm might elect a CEO or 
board dominance structure as 
compared to more balanced 
governance structures.  
The efficacy of such choices may 
depend on (1) the portfolio exposure 
and globalization of the firm, (2) its 
ownership patterns, and (3) resource 
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 Powerful actors in the CEO-board 
relationship affect the diffusion of 
board independence through the 
selection and retention of directors 
whose prior directorship experiences 


























 The mere presence of a board 
interlock tie between two firms does 
not appear to increase (or decrease) the 
likelihood that they will enter into a 
strategic alliance with one another. 
Higher level of independent board 
control over management actually 
decreased the likelihood of subsequent 
alliance formation between them, 
while higher levels of CEO/board 
cooperation in strategic decision 
making raised the likelihood that the 
two firms would enter into an alliance. 
Indirect third-party ties primarily 
amplify whatever relational 
dispositions already exist among 



























2. ROE and 
MBV 
1. the portion of a 
board appointed 
after a CEO; CEO-
board friendship 












Not only that social ties typically 
fail to reduce the level of board 
monitoring activity, but also that such 
ties enhance the provision of advice 
and counsel from outside directors on 
strategic issues. 
CEO incentive alignment 
moderated relationships between 
social ties and board involvement. 
CEO-board collaboration and 
control are independently and 


























A taxonomy of directors is 
presented specifically for studying the 
resource dependence role. 
The boar’s function as a link to 
the external environment is an 
important one, and firms respond to 
significant changes in their external 
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Board ties weighted 
by heterogeneity in 
the above four 
relatedness. 








there is no 
significant 
difference 
The monitoring and advising 
behavior of directors depends on the 
strategic perspective and base of 
expertise provided by their 
appointments to other boards.  
Strategically related board ties 
enhance board involvement in firms 
facing relatively stable environments, 
and strategically heterogeneous board 
ties enhance involvement in firms 
facing relatively unstable 
environments.  
Board interlock 
ties affect a 
firm’s corporate 
governance to the 
degree that such 
ties are aligned 
with the strategic 











































Outsider directors are associated 
with a higher sales growth 
performance, but have little impact on 
financial performance like ROE. 
Only affiliated (mostly 
institutional) directors play a positive 
role on performance. Non-affiliated 
(individual) directors have no 
influence on performance. 
The legitimacy-seeking 
imperative is documented by the 
norm-formation processes during 
which various firms appoint outside 
directors. 
Not all outside 
directors are 
likely to have a 
positive impact 



















CEO dummy  
Inside, grey 
and outside 
Independent directors have a 
bargaining advantage over the CEO 
that results in compensation more 
closely aligned with shareholder’s 
objectives.  
Firms with more non-executive 
directors on their boards award 
directors more equity-based 
compensation.  
When the CEO’s power over the 
board increases, compensation 
provides weaker incentives to monitor. 
Firms with more inside directors and 
with entrenched CEOs use less equity-
based pay.  
Firms with entrenched CEOs and 
CEOs who also chair the board are 



















251 firms in 
1998 in 
Taiwan 













and control of the 
largest shareholder, 











Board affiliation is higher when 
negative entrenchment effects are 
strong. Negative entrenchment effects 
are measured by divergence in control 
and cash flow rights, family control 
and duality. Board affiliation is lower 
when cash flow rights are higher 
(positive incentive). 
Relative firm value is negatively 


























Firms with politicians on the 
board are associated with better 
market-based performance, and the 
relationship is more pronounced 
within heavily regulated industries, 
compared to less regulated industries. 
Indications of 















Power of CEO: 





CEO power from the sources of 
ownership and duality moderate the 
negative relationship between board 
composition and firm performance 
Outside director dominated 
boards may not always benefit 
shareholder and that CEO power 
should be considered when 

















outside directors  
outside and 
inside 
Stock and stock option pay for 
outside directors are related in an 
inverted U-shaped manner to a firm’s 
acquisition rate and that for stock 
options, this relationship is moderated 




CHAPTER 3 UNRELATED DIVERSIFICATION AND 
INTERNAL RESOURCE TRANSFER IN BUSINESS GROUPS 
3.1 Introduction 
The business group literature has paid little attention to diversification strategy in group-
affiliated firms, implicitly relying on the proposition that diversification at the group level 
substitutes for and precludes diversification at the affiliate level (Charabarti, Singh, & Mahmood, 
2007). Prior studies suggest that, in less developed economies, business groups enable individual 
affiliated firms within a group to share resources. To the extent that diversified groups act as 
internal markets for their affiliated firms, there might be less need and fewer benefits for group-
affiliated firms diversifying themselves. This literature expects that diversification occurs at the 
group level is more effective than at the individual affiliated firm level (Chang and Hong, 2002; 
Khanna and Palepu, 1997; Kock and Guillen, 2001). Thus, despite the anecdotal and empirical 
evidence suggesting that group-affiliated firms do diversify (Chang and Hong, 2002), the 
questions of why they diversify and what is the outcome of this strategy remain intriguing. 
In this study, using power-seeking perspective of internal market (Scharfstein & Stein, 
2000; Rajan, Servaes, & Zingales, 2000) as conceptual springboard, I develop an enriched 
framework to explain the motives and performance of diversification strategy in group-affiliated 
firms. I argue that managers in group-affiliated firms are likely to engage in diversification as a 
strategic choice, or “protective investment”, to protect the resources generated by the affiliated 
firms from being shared by other affiliated firms in the group. Such strategy can also potentially 
help group-affiliated firms compete for a larger share of group-level slack resources. Thus, 
managers in affiliated firms can play a significant role in influencing the resource allocation 
decision in a business group. My theoretical framework highlights the need for slack resources of 
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managers in affiliated firms, information asymmetry and diverge interests between affiliated 
firms and group headquarters. 
3.2 An Enriched Power-seeking Perspective of Resource Allocation in Business Groups 
3.2.1 The Power-seeking Perspective in Diversified Firms 
 The power-seeking perspective, which is developed in the context of a diversified 
organization, is proposed in Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000)’s study. It is based on two basic 
assumptions: limited power of a headquarter over its divisions and resource sharing through 
negotiation. The first assumption states that a headquarter can only redistribute resources ex ante, 
but it cannot commit to a future distribution of resources. The second assumption is about the 
observation that resources are distributed among divisions through negotiations, and divisions 
can affect the share of resources they receive through their choice of investment. Based on the 
two assumptions, Rajan et al. argue that division managers have autonomy to choose between an 
efficient investment and a “defensive investment”. While the efficient investment maximizes the 
value of the firm, a defensive investment protects the division’s surplus from being expropriated 
by other managers. Several examples of a defensive investment are: one that is overly 
specialized, one that can reduce a division’s dependence on other divisions, or one that stays 
within a division though outsourcing it is more efficient for the division. According to the power-
seeking perspective, the self-interested division managers are more likely to choose defensive 
investments. The difficulty in contracting the surplus distribution rule among the divisions and 
the cost to monitor the investment decisions with the funds allocated within a firm enable 
divisional managers to do so. In particular, managers of divisions with more investment 
opportunity and resource endowment that create far greater surplus than other divisions have 
stronger incentive to choose defensive investments. As a result, top management will tend to 
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transfer resources from divisions with good opportunities to divisions with poor opportunities, 
leading to more inefficient investment and less valuable firms. 
 Indeed, the power-seeking perspective is related to several streams of previous literature. 
More directly related is Scharfsterin and Stein (1997) which follows the influence cost model of 
Meyer et al. (1992). The influence cost models (Milgrom, 1988; Milgrom and Roberts, 1990; 
Meyer, Milgrom, and Roberts, 1992) also recognize that divisions have incentives to attempt to 
affect the distribution of organizational decisions. Influence costs include the resources that are 
used to affect the distribution of benefits rather than to create value, the value that is lost when 
influence results in suboptimal decision, and the deterioration of organizational performance. 
The influence cost models were developed to explain the particular decisions to divest declining 
units. The models argue that senior managers of firms have discretion over a range of managerial 
decisions that can create rents and quasi-rents within the organization and they can shift the 
distribution of these rents within the organization. This creates incentives for divisions to attempt 
to influence senior managers’ decisions and alter their distributive impact. At the same time, 
senior decision makers have to rely on information provided by these division members, which 
creates the opportunity for division members to influence the resource allocation decisions. In 
particular, when a division has weak performance and bad prospect, the division’s manager is 
likely to engage in influence activities to get more resources allocated (Meyer, Milgrom, and 
Roberts, 1992). In order to justify the desired allocation, the manager may emphasize advantages 
in her own division and disadvantages in others, or even distort or conceal information. Such 
influence activities diminish organizational efficiency. In this way, the influence cost models 




 A second related class of theory that also concerns political behaviors within organization 
is the behavior theory of firm (Bourgeois, 1981; Bourgeois & Singh, 1983; Cyert & March, 
1963). Although Cyert and March (1963) contend that more slack should reduce conflict of 
divergent subunit interests and thus mitigate political activities, other behavior theorists argue 
that slack resources provide opportunity for self-aggrandizing managers to engage in political 
behaviors attempting to capture more share of new slack in the system (Astley, 1978). This is 
because when a surplus is suddenly generated, it takes time before resources are distributed 
based on technical requirements. Thus, during the period when the destination of excess 
resources has not been decided, it is “up for grabs” and division managers will engage in the 
bargaining or coalition-forming activities needed to capture some of the uncommitted resources. 
This political behavior could be more prominent during relatively bad times or emergencies 
when the necessity for cuts in slack becomes apparent. Managers will act to preserve their 
resource levels. These self-preservation instincts will be manifested through bargaining 
behaviors in the resource allocation decision process.  
3.2.2 The Enriched Power-seeking Framework and Unrelated Diversification  
In this study, I enrich the power-seeking framework with elements from influence cost 
models and the behavior theory of firm and employ it to business group context to understand the 
unrelated diversification moves in group-affiliated firms. A business group is a typical multi-
divisional structure organization (Chang and Hong, 2000), under which individual affiliated 
firms function as operating divisions that are tightly controlled by group headquarter staff 
(Chang & Choi, 1988; Chang & Hong, 2000; Chang, 2003). Compared to operating divisions, 
group-affiliated firms usually enjoy more investment autonomy. 
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The three models, in one way or another, assumes that a multi-division organization is 
characterized by problems of information asymmetry and interest divergence. Division managers 
possess private information pertinent to their divisions’ opportunities and constraints, relative to 
headquarters, which makes it difficult for headquarters to deploy resources efficiently. If goal 
congruence exists between division managers and headquarters, information asymmetry is not an 
issue because managers will want to reveal the true condition to headquarters. However, division 
managers and headquarters usually have divergent interests. As Cyert and March (1963) put: 
“Basically, each division manager was more motivated focus on his own differentiated goals 
than those of the corporation. In effect, this is what the control and reward system told him he 
should do”. Previous studies also report that when a headquarter attempted to get multiple 
divisions to collaborate in providing one product through sharing resources, the program 
immediately ran into the parochial interests of each division (Lorsch & Allen, 1973). There is 
also anecdotal evidence specific to business groups that suggests the existence of information 
asymmetry and divergent interest issues. A report (2007) from China-co, a consulting firm 
specialized in internal control of business groups, finds that, after a group acquired a new group-
affiliated firm, executives of the new group-affiliated firm have “divergent goals and strategies 
from those of the group, …and thus they tend to conceal the key operating details and report the 
financial information to the group strategically.”  Existing theories of business groups, however, 
often minimize the issues of informaton asymmetry and interest divergence. They tend to rest on 
the assumption that group headqaurters will have complete information about their affiliated 
firms so that they can allocate group-level resources to the best places. When a group-affiliated 
firm needs resources to sustain operation or expand into certain markets, the group headquarter 
can mobilize resources from other affiliated firms to help (internal market efficiency); or when a 
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group-affiliated firm generates more resources, for example, in the form of excess free cash flow, 
the group headquarter will transfer these resources away and subsidize other less profitable 
affiliated firms (cross-subsidization). In these formulations, the role of managers in group-
affilited firms in influencing resource allocation decision is minimized, too. 
The coordination in a diversified firm centers on resource allocation among divisions.  
There are two types of resources of concern in previous literature: the growth-induced resources 
of a division and the resources accrued at the firm level. Growth-induced resources can be 
accumulated as a non-intended consequence of routinized operation. It can also accrue as a result 
of good organization performance in prior period (Voss, Sirdeshmukh, & Voss, 2008). It can be 
determined by industry structure, i.e. industry nature, stage of life cycle (Sharfman, Wolf, Chase, 
& Tansik, 1988). The resources accrued at the firm level come from the capacity of the 
organization to generate extra resources from the enviormnet and are exogenous the growth of an 
individual division, as addition credit raised from banks, or scare resources obtained government 
agencies (Bourgeois & Singh, 1983). The power-seeking model focuses on managers in stronger 
division with more resources endowment and investment opportunities trying to keep the 
growth-induced resources through defensive investments. In comparison, the influence cost 
models and the behavior theory of firm stress the rent-seeking activities of division managers 
aiming at more resources accrued at the firm level. Thus, in order to under the holistic internal 
power struggles within a multi-divisional firm, it is useful to enrich the power-seeking model by 
integrating the influence cost models and the behavior theory of firm. This enriched power-
seeking perspective provides a framework to understand divisions protecting growth-induced 
resources through defensive investments and lobbying for more resources that are accrued at the 
firm level.  
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As in a diversified firm, allocating resources among affiliated firms is a major function of 
business group headquarters (Chang & Hong, 2000). Their role is to maximize group level profit 
by pooling physical and financial resources generated from affiliated firms and reallocate them 
in order of pre-determined priority (Chang & Hong, 2000). Therefore, extending the enriched 
power-seeking perspective to the business group context, I argue that managers in group-
affiliated firms, with both self-aggrandizing and self-perservation incentives, are likely to adopt 
strategies to protect their growth-induced resources from being shared by other affiliated firms 
and lobby for more resources accrued at the group level. More specifically, pursuing unrelated 
diversificaiton is likely to be a type of such strategies because, first, unrelated diversificaiton 
increases the affiliated firms’ ability to influence the group headquarters to either supply more 
resources or limit transfer away of resources. Second, diversificaiton changes the compositions 
of firms’ assets away from cash to harder-to-expropriate physical and  intangible assets.  
 My arguments are similar to that of Beneish et al. (2008), who examines diversification 
in tobacco firms in the presence of potential decline demand in tobacco and increasing political 
expropriation threats. Beneish et al suggest that tobacco firms might choose domestic geographic 
expansion to increase tobacco firms’ influence in more political districts.  Similarly, Stulz (2005) 
suggests that, in regimes with high expropriation risk, firms might choose to invest in projects 
that would have negative net present value absent expropriation risk. Other work also documents 
that firms have incentive to make income-decreasing accounting choices to reduce the likelihood 
of wealth transfer by politicians (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). I discuss this issue in detail in 
the next section.   
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3.3 Unrelated Diversification and Internal Resources Transfer 
In this study, I propose that managers in group-affiliated firms can influence the internal 
resource allocation through strategic choices, for example, engaging in unrelated diversificaiton. 
Unrelated diversification can be a “defensive investment” (Rajan et al., 2000) that prevents the 
growth-induced resources from being shared or expropriated. It can also serve as a “preemptive 
move”, helping group-affiliated firms compete for more group level resources. Several 
mechanisms help explain why unrelated diversificaiton moves can serve the two purposes. 
Firstly, unrelated diversification increases a group-affiliated firm’s power or influence in a group. 
Prior research has conceptualized business group as a power-dependence system, in which the 
power of a group-affiliated firm fundamentally resides in its dependence on other group-
affiliated firms (Kim et al., 2004). The less dependent an affiliated firm, the more power 
advantage it will maintain. Such power advantages can include better positions to voice their 
opinions on group-wide issues, less susceptibility to monitoring and influence of the group 
headquarter or other member firms, more capability to block attempts by the group headquarter 
or other member firms to force anything on them (Kim et al., 2004), or stronger bargaining 
power over issues such as transfer prices for funds (Scherer, 1980). Expanded industry presence 
can reduce a group-affiliated firm’s dependence on other group-affiliated firms, and therefore 
will strengthen its power or influence within the group (Ranjan et al., 2000). Moreover, similar 
as in the market, in business groups, entering new markets grants a group-affiliated firm more 
power in the internal market because it enables the firm to meet other member firms in more than 
one markets. This multi-market contact can increase firms’ mutual recognition of 
interdependence, dampen competitive activities, and strengthen strategic behaviour. Thus, the 
power derived from operating in multiple markets enables a group-affiliated firm to reduce the 
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likelihood and/or amount of adverse wealth transfer by the group headquarter, and increase its 
political influence in lobbying for more group-level resources.   
A second mechanism by which unrelated diversification is prefered by mamnagers in 
group-affiliated firms is through changes in the liquidity of the firms’ assets. Unrelated 
diversification can transform excess financial assets into physical and intangible assets of 
operations (Beneish et al, 2008), creating “shallower pockets” that attract less attention from 
groups. Holding excess cash in balance sheet, investing it in financial assets, or  returning it to 
shareholders may attract more attention from the group and lead to expected expropriation 
(Warner, 2006). Beneish et al (2008) provide evidence that less expected political expropriation 
costs through geographic expansion in tobacoo firms when the expanding firms’ liquidity is high, 
or when the transactions are an all-cash transactions.   
Thirdly, a critical advantage of unrelated diversification strategy is that implementation 
of such strategy can justify the requirement of more resource commitment. Diversification 
reduces both the growth-induced resources (e.g. free cash flow) and signals the need of more 
group-level resources. Diversification into other product markets is usually interpreted as a 
growth strategy (Penrose, 1959). Increased level of diversification in revenue sources of an 
affiliate signals to the group that the affiliate faces more market opportunities, or has capabilities 
to leverage into other product markets.  
Previous literature discussed that different types of slack resources give managers greater 
or lesser degrees of discretion and flexibility in their approach to protect the firm through 
reducing internal or external pressures (Sharfman, Wolf, Chase, & Tansik, 1988). Drawing on 
these studies, I classify the slack resources into redeployable and non-redeployable resources. 
Redeployable resources refer to highly flexible resources that can provide a variety of difference 
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services and can be converted to other uses easily (Sharfman et al., 1988; Tan & Peng, 2003). 
The more specific a resource is to a particular use, the less discretion management has in 
deploying excess amounts to alternative uses (e.g., Wernerfelt and Montgomery, 1988). 
Examples of redeployable resources include land use right, cash or credit lines that are available 
for use for a variety of purposes (Voss et al., 2008). In contrast, non-redeployable resources, 
which serve a particular use, cannot be easily deployed to alternative uses (e.g. Montgomery and 
Wernerfelt, 1988). Examples include stocks of dedicated investments such as production 
capacity and specialized skilled labor (Greve, 2003). Non-redeployable resources can be used 
only as protection in a few specific situations, such increased demand or capacity failure 
(Sharfman, Wolf, Chase, & Tansik, 1988). Structural constraints limit their redeployment for 
novel or exploratory activities. Moreover, once allocated, their specialized nature make them less 
useful if the task at hand changes (Mishina, Pollock, & Porac, 2004). Excess non-redeployable 
resources may even be viewed as costs (Voss et al., 2008). Therefore, managers in group-
affiliated firm are more likely to adopt unrelated diversification strategies to protect as well as to 
compete for more redeployable resources. These arguments lead to the following prediction: 
Hypothesis 1: Group-affiliated firms with higher level of unrelated diversification will be 
associated with more net-inflow of redeployable resources from the business groups. 
3.4 Acquired Group Resources and Performance of Unrelated Diversification 
Up to this point, I have argued that managers in group-affiliated firms may have 
incentives to pursue unrelated diversification strategy to influence the internal transfer of 
resources within business groups. However, the impact of the resource allocation on the 
subsequent performance of the diversification strategy remains unclear. In this section, I will 
look into this issue in detail.  
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In essence, I argue that the subsequent economic impact is contingent on the market 
availability of the resources transferred. Many factors may influence the availability of resources. 
Some resources can be rare and valuable because exchange of such resources involves a large 
amount of transaction costs. The high transaction costs can relate to the presence of context-
dependent features of certain resources. For example, the tacit nature of technological knowledge 
raises information asymmetries for the buying firm. In order to avoid incurring those costs, firms 
have traditionally limited their access to technology trade, and have preferred to develop 
technologies in-house or to integrate backwards towards technology supply (Grossman and Hart, 
1986; Teece, 1988; Pisano, 1990). In addition, the high transaction costs can also relate to the 
evolution of institutional environment. Government regulations and interventions, in particular in 
emerging economies, may also lead to market unavailability of certain resources. For example, 
higher entry barriers to certain markets for private-owned competitors and foreign investments 
largely affect the market development of resources (Fan, Wang, Zhang, & Zhu, 2003). These 
regulations and interventions make the resources less available for organizations. In addition, the 
market development for some sources requires other conditions to be satisfied. For example, 
transactions of technology require higher contract law enforcement and property right 
protections which are absent in emerging economies. It is worthnoting that institutional 
environment in emerging economies is evolving quickly. The emergence of intermediaries and 
reduction of transaction costs make resources previously unavailable become gradually available 
in these economies.  
In particular, when the transferred redeployable resources are unavailable in the market, 
they usually take the form of ownership rights of legal agreements that give an organization 
control over scarce and valuable inputs, patents, proprietary technology or rights to use scarce 
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resources. Higher net inflow of such resources from the groups is most likely to benefit the 
group-affiliated firms’ diversification move for the following reasons. Exclusive access to the 
market-unavailable redeployable resources provides affiliated firms with competitive advantages, 
in comparison to stand-alone firms. Acquisition of this type of resources from business groups 
can facilitate introduction of new products or entering new markets of a group-affiliated firm. 
Such resources mute the problems of resource scarcity and provide a source of funds for these 
activities that would normally face difficulties in the face of lack of these resources. Take land 
use right in China for example. China adopts dual land tenure system under which land 
ownership is independent of land use rights. The land is owned either by the state ("State Land") 
or by rural collective economic organization ("Collective Land"). Firms can acquire land use 
rights in state land by grant, allocation or lease. Along with the market reforms in China, the 
competition for land use rights has become intensive and most firms find it difficult, costly, or 
time-consuming to obtain land use rights. This underdeveloped external market largely hinders 
the expansion of Chinese enterprises. Business groups usually have privilege in obtaining land 
use rights because of their reputation, significance in the local economy or political ties. As a 
result, business groups are commonly large owners of land use rights. They can coordinate the 
expansion needs of their affiliated firms and provide support by transferring land use rights 
among them. Acquisitions of this sort of assets from business groups largely relieve the 
predicaments of diversification strategy faced by the group-affiliated firms. Take technology for 
another example. Previous literature suggests that business groups facilitate innovation by 
providing institutional infrastructures (Mahmood and Mitchell, 2004). In emerging economies, 
innovation activities in stand-alone firms are hindered by the relatively inefficient markets. By 
contrast, business groups are able to raise external capital more easily due to lower default risk 
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and greater ability to attract foreign capital (Khanna and Yafeh, 2000), to incubate a pool of 
talented scientists, to create technological linkages with firms in advanced economies (Hobday, 
1995). Therefore, business groups possess more resources to conduct innovation activities. 
Access to the outputs of these innovations, such as patents or proprietary technology, can open 
up the possibility for differentiation and segmentation and firms achieve higher performance by 
exploiting a “core skill” (Bettis, 1981).  
In sum, consistent with the internal market efficiency perspective, I propose the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Acquiring market unavailable redeployable resources will improve the 
profitability of unrelated diversification in group-affiliated firms.  
 
Another type of redeployable resources that affiliates can acquire from their group is 
market-available redeployable resources, which can have alternative uses and can be quickly 
obtained from the market. One important form of a market-available and redeployable resource 
is financial resource. Financial resources are in general the most flexible of all resources and the 
easiest to redeploy in different markets (Greve, 2003). Previous studies have suggested that the 
internal market benefits of business group decline along with market development in emerging 
economies (Khanna and Palepu, 2000). Thus, the costs of acquiring market available and 
redeployable resources from groups are likely to exceed the benefits because, firstly, easier 
access to market-available redeployable resources may lead the affiliate management less 
scrutinous in scanning alternative investment opportunities or seizing the timing of entry 
(Bourgeois, 1981), or to pursue undisciplined investment activities that rarely yield economic 
benefits (Jensen, 1986, 1993; Nohria and Gulati, 1996). Ozbas and Scharfstein (2008) provide 
evidence that the investment of stand-alone businesses is generally more responsive to the 
industry investment opportunities than is the investment of conglomerate segments.  
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Secondly,  business group structure can offset external monitoring mechanisms for 
utilizing such resources. Prior research has shown that debt can serve a disciplinary role by 
limiting managerial discretion over investment, which is valuable for shareholders if investment 
projects exhibit poor growth opportunities. When a firm is affiliated with a business group, it 
may access cheaper loans that are based less on the projects’ economic merits (Chang & Hong, 
2000). For instance, the banks may provide the loans to state-owned business group affiliates due 
to central or local government influence. In addition, the banks may relax the borrowing 
conditions on the repayment capacity of the firms or the growth potential of the projects because 
of the debt guarantees provided by the group headquarter or other affiliates. The debt guarantees 
between the apparently independent loan borrower (the affiliated firm) and the guaranteeing 
party (the group), however, is not reliable because the two parties are actually intricately related 
and economically dependent on each other. These arguments lead to the below prediction: 
Hypothesis 3: Acquiring market available redeployable resources will decrease the 
profitability of unrelated diversification in group-affiliated firms.  
 I summarize the above-discussed framework to understand unrelated diversification 









I tested the hypotheses using the related party transactions of all Chinese listed 
companies over the period of 2000 to 2005. I collected the dataset in three steps. Firstly, I 
identified whether a Chinese listed company belonged to a business group using Large 
Corporations of China; a list from the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission of the State Council (SASAC). Large Corporations of China is a directory 
published by the NBSC and it is an authoritative publicly available source of data on Chinese 
business groups. I identified the group affiliation of a listed company by examining if its largest 
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shareholder is in the list of the business groups in this publication. I matched the largest 
shareholders of the listed companies to the group name lists and found 790 public firms in China 
affiliated with business groups. Secondly, I used CSMAR Financial Database developed by 
CSMAR info for the data of related party transactions. CSMAR database is a leading provider of 
financial data in China that serves over 1500 domestic financial companies and has reputable 
financial institutions like Merrill Lynch, Credit Suisse, and CLSA as its customers in the 
international market. By timely updating their data from annual reports, semi-annual reports, and 
various announcements made by each company, CSMAR database provides a complete data of 
“related party transactions” reported in the reports of all Chinese listed companies. Chinese listed 
companies’ annual reports are required by the authority to disclose the identities of their related 
parties in these transactions. They include the firms’ controlling shareholder, significant 
shareholders, member firms under a same controlling shareholder, subsidiaries and so on. The 
related party transactions also have a variety of types including purchase and sales of goods and 
services, joint venture, purchase and sales of assets, providing debt guarantee etc. In this study, I 
focus on two of the most common transactions between the group affiliated listed firms and their 
group: debt guarantee and acquisition of intangible assets. In total, I have 2811 records of these 
transactions over 2000 to 2005, among which reception of debt guarantee was the most frequent 
transactions (1,200 records) followed by transactions related to intangible assets (812 records), 
provision of debt guarantee (476 records). Lastly, I collected other firm level information 
(including performance, equity shareholding, sales, assets etc) of all Chinese listed companies 
from 2000 to 2005 from CSMAR database. We then merged our business group data and related 
party transactions data with the firm level information. Thus, my final sample consisted of a total 
of 2383 observations of 790 group-affiliated companies.  
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Table 3.1 Patterns of Capital and Assets Flows between Business Group-affiliated Listed Firms 




and Cash (no of 
events) 
Receipts of Debt 
Guarantee and 
Cash (no of 
events) 
Intangible Assets 
Acquisition (no of 
events) 
2000 67 167 151 
2001 94 214 167 
2002 108 286 169 
2003 95 264 181 
2004 84 222 95 
2005 28 47 49 
Total 476 1200 812 
 
Table 3.2 Summary Intragroup Resources Transfer Characteristics 
 Sample: Group Firms 
 Mean Median Min Max 
Gross group financial resources 
inflows (in millions of rmb) 2400 161 0 8014 
Gross group financial resources 
outflows (in millions of rmb) 343 80 0 33966 
Gross group intangible assets inflows 
(in millions of rmb) 54 1.97 0 17824 
Financial resources net receivers (in 
millions of rmb) 245 161 0 8014 
Financial resources net providers (in 
millions of rmb) 271 70 0 33550 
Group financial resources 
inflow/Equity (in percent) 45.1 24.4 0 618 
3.5.2 Variables 
Transfer of redeployable resources. I used the sum of market available and unavailable 
resources as the measure of acquisition of redeployable resources, which includes both financial 
resources and intangible resources. Transfer of market available redeployable resources.  
Financial resources represent a key market available redeployable resource. The financial 
flowing within business groups takes various forms such as cash, loans, debt guarantees, and 
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venture capital. In China, bank loan is the main source for firms to obtain funds and the most 
common way for business groups to provide financial resources is through supplying debt 
guarantees to their affiliates. A debt guarantee to a business group affiliate refers to a guarantee 
issued by the group or other affiliates who will ensure repayment of a loan made to the affiliate 
by a bank. Receiving debt guarantees enables an affiliate to obtain financing at lower interest rate 
than otherwise would be available. Firms that provide debt guarantees are fully exposed to the 
default risk because in most cases, the debt guarantee is a joint liability guarantee. In a general 
guarantee relationship, the guarantor needs to fulfill his responsibility only when the guarantee is 
not able to fulfill the liability or liquidated. In a joint liability guarantee relationship, however, 
banks can ask either the debtor or the guarantor to repay the loans. Technically, this is the 
equivalent of the guarantor borrowing money from banks for the guarantee. Such arrangement 
thus increases the contingent liability of the guarantor and limits its ability to raise capital. I 
could not measure the extent of direct loans between affiliates since loans are usually short-term 
financing and the financial statements do not have detailed disclosure on them. The same 
measurement have been used in previous business group literature (e.g. Chang and Hong, 2000; 
Chang, 2003). Therefore, I measure transfer of market available redeployable resources by a 
business group’s net supply of debt guarantee at time t, divided by the equity base of the 
receiving affiliate.  Transfer of market unavailable redeployable resources. I use intangible 
assets as the proxy for market unavailable redeployable resources. Business groups transfer 
intangible assets like patents, brand names, technology, and land use rights to their affiliates. I 
measure transfer of market unavailable redeployable resources by a business group’s transfer of 
intangible assets at time t, divided by the equity base of the receiving affiliate.  
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Unrelated diversification. I operationalize unrelated diversification in two ways. The first 
is a measure using an entropy index approach (Palepu, 1985). The entropy measure of a firm’s 
diversification is defined as "a weighted average of the shares of the segments" (Palepu, 1985, p. 
252). The weight is assumed the logarithm of the inverse of the proportion of total business in 
each segment (Chatterjee & Blocher, 1992). The values of indices vary from zero to values 
greater than one. The greater the value of the index, the greater is the diversification level of a 
firm. The entropy measure is attractive because it takes into account "two elements of 
diversification: (i) the number of segments in which a firm operates, and (ii) the relative 
importance of each of the segments in the total sales" (Palepu, 1985, p. 252). 
Using the information on revenues by product category for Chinese listed companies, I 
calculated the entropy indices of unrelated diversification for the year t in the following manner. 
Consider a firm operating in N industry segments (four-digit SIC industries). Those N industry 
segments aggregate into M industry groups (two-digit SIC industries). Let Pi be the share of the 
ith segment in the total sales of the firm. The unrelated diversification is defined as: 
Unrelated diversification=∑ ∑ Pij ln� 1𝑃𝑖𝑗�iϵjM  
 I calculated increased unrelated diversification as an increase in the entropy measure 
exceeding one standard deviation, to capture relatively significant change and exclude change 
that reflects random alterations in segment sales levels (Amit and Livnat, 1988; Zajac and 
Westphal, 1996). The results were substantively similar using alternative thresholds, such as an 
increase of one-half of one standard deviation. The standard deviation is based on change in 
diversification from year t-1 to year t.   
The second measure of unrelated diversification is addition of industry groups. It is a 
dummy variable that equals one when a firm adds in one or more industry groups (two-digit SIC 
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industries) where the firm does not yet have operations in a particular year. The dummy variable 
is assigned to zero when it divests industry groups or stays in the same industry groups. Table 
3.3 summarizes the product market change in Chinese group-affiliated firms from 2000-2005. 
Table 3.3 shows that, over the years, approximately 20% of Chinese group-affiliated firms 
expand into one or more industry groups each year, though fewer firms are continuing the 
expansion in years that are more recent.  
Table 3.3 Product Market Change in Chinese Group-Affiliated Firms (No. of firms and %) 
Year 
Change of Industry Groups (two-digit SIC code) 
Total No.  -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
2001 7 1.15  27 4.42  81 13.26 292 47.79 125 20.46 54 8.84  25 4.09 611 
2002 11 1.54  32 4.48  88 12.31 389 54.41 137 19.16 37 5.17  21 2.94 715 
2003 17 2.83  49 8.15  114 18.97 301 50.08 91 15.14 19 3.16  10 1.66 601 
2004 6 0.97  15 2.42  61 9.855 403 65.11 109 17.61 18 2.91  7 1.13 619 
2005 8 1.09  17 2.31  97 13.18 516 70.11 79 10.73 17 2.31  2 0.27 736 
Note: Zero indicates that firms operate in the same portfolio of industry groups as the previous year. One (or two, 3) 
indicates that firms expand into one (or two, three) more industry group(s) (two-digit SIC code) in this year, 
compared to the previous year, while -1 (or -2. -3) indicates that firms divest one (or two, three) industry group(s) in 
this year, compared to the previous year.  
Firm Profitability. To facilitate comparison with prior research (e.g. Kim, et al., 2004; 
Chakrabarti, et al., 2007), we initially considered using one or all of the three accounting-based 
measures: return on assets (ROA), return on total sales (ROS) and return on equity (ROE). 
Geringer, Tallman and Olsen (2000) provided an extensive argument for justifying the use of 
accounting-based performance measures. ROA and ROS are frequently used by managers and 
external analysts as a measure of management effectiveness and the various measures of 
profitability are typically related (Robins and Wiersema, 1995). In addition, the announcement of 
such figures as ROA or ROS is usually followed by changes in stock prices, which indicates that 
these reports have significant signaling effects (Fama and Miller, 1972). ROE is a better measure 
of profitability if capital markets are mature and competitive. In the case of developing countries 
such as China where the debt-equity ratio is high and capital markets are imperfect, ROA and 
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ROS are considered superior indicators to ROE. This ruled out ROE.  Given that both ROS and 
the control variables in our regression equations were functions of total sales, regression 
equations with ROS as the dependent variable might reflect mathematical artifacts as well as true 
relations (Farris, Parry, & Ailawadi, 1992). As such, we employed ROA rather than ROS as our 
dependent variable, computed as the ratio of net income to total assets. ROA is also superior than 
other market-based performance measures as assets are less likely to be reported strategically or 
to be manipulated (Rajan et al., 2000). As such, I employed ROA as my dependent variable in all 
cases. ROA is computed as net income divided by average total assets.  
Control Variables. As previously mentioned, Chinese business groups can generally be 
divided into two types by ownership, i.e. state-owned/government-owned and private-owned 
(Ma & Lu, 2005). Companies with different ownership identity can pursue different 
diversification strategy (Delios, Zhou & Xu, 2008). Therefore, I included a dummy variable to 
control for the effect of ownership structure. This dummy variable, state control, equals 1 if the 
business group is state owned, 0 if it is privately owned. In addition to ownership structure, the 
ownership concentration can also affect the ability of the group in pooling and distributing 
resources among its member firms. For instance, a group shareholder has a grater control (and 
interest) over an affiliated company which it wholly owns (i.e. 100%) as compared to another 
which it owns less shares (e.g. 15%). To control for this difference, I included the group 
shareholding as a control in the analysis.   To account for industry effects (Dess, Ireland, and Hitt, 
1990), I included a set of 18 indicator variables to mark each firm’s primary 2-digit industry. I 
included a measure of firm size, as measured by the natural log of firm sales, as size has 
consistently been found to be related to the performance of a firm. I included the debt to equity 
ratio to control for financial structure, as heavily leveraged firms tend to have lower performance 
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than those with a lower debt to equity ratio. By controlling for financial structure, I separated the 
effects of debt reliance from those of group affiliation. I included firm age to account for firm 
experience effects. Finally, given the multiple observations I had across time, I included 
indicator variables to mark the year of observation. Noted that for the sake of ease of 
presentation of the results, I did not display the coefficient estimates for the year and industry 
fixed effects. 
3.5.3 Analysis 
To analyze change in unrelated diversification and net inflow of redeployable resources, first, I 
needed to adjust for possible endogeneity since each firm’s top executives can decide on the 
firm’s level of diversification (Fan, et al, 2008). This decision could well reflect a range of 
background factors that might also affect the flow of redeployable resources and the firm’s 
profitability. Following the procedures in previous studies (Fan, et al, 2008), I employed the 
Heckman two-staged model that corrects for endogeneity in regression analysis as below:  
For testing Hypothesis 1: 
Increase in Unrelated Diversification Dummyt=α10+Exogeneous Controlst +  
Other Controlst + ε11     (1)                                
 Net inflow of Redeployable Resourcest=α20+β21 ∆Unrelated Diversificationt-1+ Inverse 
Mills Ratio (IMR)+ γ22 Other Independent Variables t+ Controlst+ε21    (2) 
For testing Hypothesis 2 and 3:   
Unrelated Diversification Dummyt=α’10+Exogeneous Controlst + Other Controlst + ε’11 
(1)          
Firm Profitabilityt+1=α’20+β’21Unrelated Diversificationt + Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) + 
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γ’22 Other Independent Variables t+ Controlst+ε’21    (2) 
I first estimated a bivariate probit regression (equation 1) of an indicator variable for 
increase in unrelated diversification on a set of exogenous explanatory variables, including asset 
structure (current asset divided by current liability), account receivable (account receivable to 
total assets), inventory (inventory to total assets) and other control variables, including firm size, 
leverage, age, year dummies and industry dummies. Here, the indicator variable for increase in 
unrelated diversification is dichotomous, rather than continuous. I then included the resulting 
inverse mills ratio as an additional explanatory variable, alongside unrelated diversification 
change, in my second stage random-effects General-Least-Square (GLS) regression (equation 2).  
The analytical approach estimates change in strategy (Johnston and DiNardo, 1997), and 
has been widely used in the empirical literature on strategy, structure and performance (e.g., 
Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 1997; Haveman, 1993; Zajac and Westphal, 1994; Westphal and 
Fredrickson, 2001). The primary models for Hypothesis 1 estimate change in unrelated 
diversification in year t-1 on net inflow of resources in year t. The primary models for 
Hypothesis 2 and 3 estimate unrelated diversification in year t on firm profitability in year t+1. 
This lag structure has been shown to be long enough to capture change in firms with more 
protracted decision-making processes, but also short enough to reflect the influence of managers 
and directors at time t (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992; Westphal and Fredrickson, 2001).     
I also fit the fix-effects GLS regression and obtained similar results as the random-effects 
estimation. This procedure, in theory, provides a clearer estimate of the effect of unrelated 
diversification change on transfer of redeployable resources and economic performance of 
group-affiliated firms. My specification also included firm fixed effects, controlling which 
allows me to control for unobserved heterogeneity, as long as this is constant over time. Thus, 
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my findings are not affected by cross-sectional differences in organizational structure or 
reporting, as long as these firm characteristics are stable over time.    
3.6 Results 
 Table 3.4 shows descriptive statistics (Panel A) and a correlation matrix (Panel B) for the 
variables in all models. The correlation matrix suggests that the collinearity among the variables 
is low. The correlation between the two measures of unrelated diversification, the entropy 
measure and the number of operating industry groups, is 0.76 (p-value<0.01). Table 3.5 reports 
net inflow of redeployable resources from group across affiliated firms with different level of 
change in unrelated diversification in time t-1. I computed the mean of net inflow of 
redeployable resource for each individual category of affiliated firms and found that affiliated 
firms with an increase in unrelated diversification in time t-1 are associated with more net inflow 
of redeployable resources in time t. This is consistent with my hypothesis 1.  
Table 3.6 and Table 3.7 present the results of regression models explaining net inflow of 
redeployable resources. Each table uses a different measure of unrelated diversification (entropy 
measure or number of operating industry groups). Panel A in both tables reports the first stage 
Heckman correction model explaining the binary decision of increase of unrelated diversification.  
Panel B reports the second stage GLS estimation explaining the net inflow of redeployable 
resources. In Panel B of Table 3.6, the coefficient on the change of entropy measure in the 
previous year is 0.018 (Z-value=4.22), indicating that 1% increase of unrelated diversification in 
a group-affiliated firm increases the net inflow of redeployable resources by 1.8%, ceteris 
paribus. In Panel B of Table 3.7, the coefficient on addition of industry groups is 0.006 (Z-
value=2.60), indicating that adding in one more industry group in time t-1 is associated with 0.6% 
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increase of net inflow of redeployable resources. Both results support the primary prediction of 
the power-seeking hypothesis.  
State control shows a significant positive effect in Panel B of Table 3.6, indicating that 
firms affiliated with state-controlled business groups receive more net inflow of redeployable 
resources. This may be because that, in China, state-owned business groups receive more 
government support such as favorite conditions, monopolistic positions, or strategic resources 
including capital and business licenses (e.g. Nolan, 2001) and therefore there are more resources 
to transfer from the group level to the affiliated firm level in state-owned business groups. An 
alternative explaination could be that state-owned business groups tend to transfer resources to 
their listed affiliated companies while private-owned business groups tend to transfer away 
resources from their listed affiliated companies. This is the so-called “principle-principle” 
agency issues.  The coefficient on prior firm performance, in Panel B of Table 3.7, is -0.036 (Z-
value=-2.56), consistent with my prediction that relatively well-performed group-affiliated firms 
are associated with lower level of net inflow of redeployable resources, or higher level of 
outflow of redeployable resources. The coefficient on group shareholding, in Panel B of Table 
3.7, is 0.009 (p-value=1.74), indicating firms with larger group shareholding is associated with 
higher level of net inflow of redeployable resources. Other firm-specific covariates, including 
age, size or leverage, appear to have no influence on the net inflow of redeployable resources.  
 Table 3.8 and Table 3.9 report the Heckman models explaining the diversification-
performance relationship with two different unrelated diversification measures respectively. 
Panel A in both tables reports the first stage Heckman correction models explaining the binary 
decision of unrelated diversification. Panel B in both tables reports the second stage GLS 
estimation explaining the diversification-performance relationship. The results are generally 
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consistent across both tables and largely support my predictions. I estimated four versions of the 
second stage models. Model 1 shows the effects of the various covariates included as controls. 
This model served as a baseline from which the analysis proceeded. In model 2, I included 
unrelated diversification to assess its possible effects on firm profitability, together with the 
inverse mill ratio produced in the first stage of Heckman correction models. Unrelated 
diversification shows a significant negative impact on the performance of group-affiliated firms, 
when it is measured by number of operating industry groups (Table 3.9). Model 3 further 
included the direct effects for the two forms of redeployable resources on firm profitability. 
Acquiring intangible assets from the group in general shows a negative coefficient, while more 
net inflow of financial assets shows a positive and significant coefficient (β=0.003, p<0.01).  
 The most important results are those in Model 4 concerning the moderating effects of net 
inflow of the two types of redeployable resources on diversification performance. The model in 
both Table 3.8 and Table 3.9 shows a significant positive effect of the interaction of acquired 
intangible assets and unrelated diversification on performance. This supports hypothesis 2, which 
predicts a positive relationship between acquired intangible resources from business groups and 
the performance of unrelated diversification. Model 4 also shows a significant negative effect of 
net inflow of financial assets from business groups on the performance of unrelated 
diversification. Hypothesis 3 predicts a negative impact of market available redeployable 
resources on the performance of unrelated diversification strategy. Thus, hypothesis 3 is 
supported.  
 The results for the control variables are logical. Higher shareholding held by the business 
groups shows a positive relationship with the firms’ profitability. As the existing studies suggest, 
concentrated shareholders can act as monitors to the management of the firms. Firm size has a 
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positive effect on its profitability. Highly levered firms perform poorer. Firm age shows a 
marginal significant positive effect on firm performance. Companies affiliated with state-owned 
groups perform significantly poorer compared to those affiliated with other ownership types. 
To better understand the results, I plot ROA by unrelated diversification based on Model 4 
in Table 3.8 Panel B (see Figure 3.2). The left graph in Figure 3.2 shows that, in firms acquiring 
less intangible assets from the groups, the profitability is slightly decreasing along unrelated 
diversification. In contrast, in firms that acquire more intangible assets from the groups, the 
profitability of unrelated diversification shows an increasing trend. The right graph indicates that 
firms with more net inflow of financial resources from the groups show a decreasing 
performance along unrelated diversification. In comparison, the profitability in firms acquiring 
less financial resources is increasing when they diversify further. Thus, the patterns demonstrated 
in the two graphs are consistent with my hypotheses. 
3.7 Robustness Check 
 I employ Granger causality test to check the causal relationships between more net inflow 
of redeployable resources and unrelated diversification. This is to test the robustness of my 
power-seeking hypothesis concerning that group-affiliated firms adopt unrelated diversify 
strategy to protect and compete for more redeployable resources, not that more redeployable 
resources transferred from business groups induce higher diversification. The granger causality 
test consists of equation (3) and (4) regarding the casual and reverse causal relationship of the 
two variables, respectively. 
 Net Inflow of Redeployable Resourcest=α10+β11∆Unrelated Diversificationt-1 + 
Controlst+ε11                  (3)                                                                     
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 ∆Unrelated Diversificationt==α20+β21Net Inflow of Redeployable Resourcest-1 + 
Controlst+ε21                  (4) 
 I observe that the addition of diversification change in time t-1 in equation (3) shows a 
significant positive effect on the subsequent net inflow of redeployable resources. However, in 
equation (4), the net inflow of redeployable resources at time t-1 does not show a significant 
effect on the subsequent change in diversification. This result confirms my hypothesis.  
3.8 Summary 
By studying unrelated diversification strategies in group-affiliated firms, this study 
highlights the information asymmetry and interest divergence problem in a business group. The 
overall message is that managers in group-affiliated firms adopt unrelated diversification strategy 
in order to protect or compete for more redeployable resources. Acquiring market unavailable 
resources has conferred competitive advantage to group-affiliated firms and facilitates the 
diversification moves. In contrast, more market available resources may strengthen the agency 
issues in group-affiliated firms and lead to imprudent investments with lower subsequent returns.   
This study naturally raises a question: How do business groups control such information 
asymmetry and interest divergence problem in order to improve the group efficiency? To answer 
this question, it is important to investigate the corporate governance system that would guard 
against ill-conceived diversification moves. In the next Chapter, I will look into the main control 
mechanism, the board of directors of group-affiliated firms, and make an effort to provide an 
explanation to this question. 
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Table 3.4 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix for Variables Used 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics 
 Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
1 ROA 0.020 0.074 -0.983 0.457 
2 Unrelated Diversification (Entropy) 0.404 0.410 0.000 1.927 
3 Unrelated Diversification (Number of Operating Industry Groups) 2.457 1.451 1.000 8.000 
4 Intangible Assets Acquired from the Group 0.004 0.031 0.000 0.817 
5 Net inflow of Financial Resources from the Group 0.072 0.884 -33.306 4.680 
6 Group Shareholding (%) 42.674 17.122 5.780 85.000 
7 Firm Size (sales in millions) 779 1220 0.100 9080 
8 Firm Leverage (d/e) 1.140 1.016 0.052 9.936 
9 Firm Age 12.142 9.571 3.000 149.000 
10 State Control (Dummy) 0.856 0.351 0.000 1.000 
11 Account Receivables 0.088 0.081 0.000 0.831 
12 Asset Structure 1.503 1.067 0.008 9.627 
13 Inventory Ratio 0.152 0.135 0.000 0.881 
14 Business Group Affiliation 0.706 0.455 0.000 1.000 
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Panel B. Correlation 
 




Same diversifiedt-1 More diversifiedt-1 Difference 
N 1932 927 2032  
Mean -0.027 -0.004 0.014 0.018** 
      Note: **p value<0.05 
 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 ROA 1             




(Number of Operating Industry 
Groups) 
-0.01  0.76  1          
 
4 Intangible Assets Acquired from the Group 0.00  0.02  0.02  1         
 
5 Net inflow of Financial Resources from the Group 0.01  0.01  0.01  -0.01  1        
 
6 Group Shareholding (%) 0.09  -0.14  -0.09  0.03  0.03  1        
7 Firm Size (sales in millions) 0.06  -0.09  -0.01  -0.01  0.01  0.20  1       
8 Firm Leverage (d/e) -0.03  -0.02  0.00  0.01  -0.01  -0.04  0.00  1      
9 Firm Age  -0.04  0.02  -0.02  -0.01  -0.02  -0.19  0.03  0.02  1     
10 State Control (Dummy) 0.02  -0.06  -0.05  0.03  0.03  0.21  0.06  0.01  -0.06  1   
 
11 Account Receivables  -0.03  -0.05  -0.04  0.01  0.00  0.02  -0.03  -0.01  -0.07  -0.06  1  
 
12 Asset Structure  0.05  -0.07  -0.07  -0.01  -0.01  0.02  -0.04  -0.05  -0.04  -0.01  -0.01  1  
13 Inventory Ratio  -0.01  0.02  0.04  0.00  0.02  -0.04  0.01  0.01  0.02  -0.01  -0.03  -0.01  1 
14 Business Group Affiliation  0.07  -0.06  -0.06  0.07  0.04  0.28  0.13  0.00  -0.05  0.18  0.06  0.02  0.07  
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Table 3.6 Unrelated Diversification for Net Inflow of Redeployable Resource: Heckman 
Two-Staged Correction Models 
Panel A: First Stage Probit Regression Explaining Indicator Variable  of Unrelated 
Diversification Change  
 
Coefficients Z value 
Account Receivables  -0.025 -0.07 
Asset Structure  -0.028* -1.68 
Inventory Ratio -0.421** -1.98 
Industry dummies Included 
Year dummies Included 
                        Number of Observations                                              2383 
Number of Firms                                                           790 
                         Log likelihood                                                            -2204.5 
 
Panel B: Second Stage GLS Regression of Net Inflow of 




Change of Unrelated Diversificationt-1 0.018*** 4.22 
Inverse Mills ratio for diversification (IMR) -0.054** -2.05 
Controls 
  
Profitabilityt-1 -0.018 -0.82 
Group Shareholding -0.006 -0.93 
Firm Size 0.001 0.44 
Firm Leverage -0.001 -0.06 
Firm Age 0.002 0.70 
State Control 0.005** 1.23 
Industry dummies Included 
Year dummies Included 
Number of Observations 2383 
Number of Firms 790 
Note: The dependent variable is the net inflow of redeployable resources at time t.  
***p<0.01 
**p value<0.05 





Table 3.7 Unrelated Diversification for More Redeployable Resource: Heckman Two-
Staged Correction Models 
Panel A: First Stage Probit Regression Explaining Addition of Industry Groups 
Indicator Variable 
 
Coefficients Z value 
Account Receivables  -0.489 -1.50 
Asset Structure  -0.026 -1.57 
Inventory Ratio -0.208 -1.04 
Industry dummies Included 
Year dummies Included 
                        Number of Observations                                             2383 
Number of Firms                                                           790 
                         Log likelihood                                                            -1775.9 
 
Panel B: Second Stage GLS regression of Net Inflow of 




Addition of Industry Groupst-1 0.006*** 2.60 
Inverse Mills ratio for diversification (IMR) -0.121*** -5.05 
Controls 
  
Profitabilityt-1 -0.036** -2.56 
Group Shareholding 0.009 1.56 
Firm Size 0.001 0.28 
Firm Leverage 0.001 0.23 
Firm Age 0.003 1.74 
State Control 0.005 1.30 
Industry dummies Included 
Year dummies Included 
Number of Observations 2383 
Number of Firms 790 
Note: The dependent variable is the net inflow of redeployable resources at time t.  
***p<0.01 
**p value<0.05 




Table 3.8 Resource Inflow and the Performance (ROA) of Unrelated Diversification 
(Entropy Measure): Heckman Two-Staged Correction Models 
Panel A: First Stage Probit Regression Explaining Indicator Variable of Unrelated 
Diversification 
 
Coefficients Z value 
Account Receivables  0.587 0.90 
Asset Structure  -0.092*** -3.31 
Inventory Ratio -0.211 -0.51 
Industry dummies Included 
Year dummies Included 
Number of Observations                                                                                 2383 
Number of Firms                                                                                             
790 





Panel B: Second Stage GLS Regression of Firm Profitability on Unrelated 
Diversification (Entropy Measure) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model  4 
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Industry Dummies Included Included Included Included 
Year dummies Included Included Included Included 
Observations 2383 2383 2383 2383 
No. of Firms 790 790 790 790 
Note: The dependent variable is firm performance measured as ROA in the next year. Z-statistics 
are reported in the paraphrase. 
***p<0.01 
**p value<0.05 




Table 3.9 Resource Inflow and the Performance (ROA) of Unrelated Diversification 
(Number of Operating Industry Groups): Heckman Two-Staged Correction Models 
Panel A: First Stage Probit Regression Explaining Indicator Variable of Unrelated 
Diversification (No. of Operating Industry Groups):  
 
Coefficients Z value 
Account Receivables  0.587 0.90 
Asset Structure  -0.092*** -3.31 
Inventory Ratio -0.211 -0.51 
Industry dummies Included 
Year dummies Included 
                        Number of Observations                                              2838 
Number of Firms                                                           790 





Panel B: Second Stage GLS Regression of Firm Profitability on Unrelated 
Diversification (No. of Operating Industry Groups):  
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model  4 
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Industry Dummies Included Included Included Included 
Year dummies Included Included Included Included 
Observations 2383 2383 2383 2383 
No. of Firms 790 790 790 790 
Note: The dependent variable is firm performance measured as ROA in the next year. Z-statistics 
are reported in the paraphrase. 
***p<0.01 
**p value<0.05 




Figure 3.2 The Interaction Effect of Resource Flow on the Performance of Unrelated Diversification 
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Low net inflow of financial resources from group 
High net inflow of financial resources from group 
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CHAPTER 4 CONTROL ROLE OR RESOURCE 
ROLE? THE CONTINGENT ROLE OF GROUP-




In the previous chapter, I find empirical evidence that management of group-
affiliated firms adopts unrelated diversification, in order to (1) prohibit the growth-
induced slack resources from being shared with other group-affiliated firms; and (2) 
compete for a larger share of slack resources accumulated at the group level. In this 
way, group-affiliated firms manage to obtain more net-inflow of redeployable 
resources from business groups. The arguments highlight the information asymmetry 
and divergent interests between the business group and the affiliated firms 
surrounding diversification strategy at the affiliated firm level. These findings 
naturally lead to a research question of interest: how do group headquarters control 
such information asymmetry and interest divergence problems?  
Previous studies on business groups suggest that ties that link group-affiliated 
firms together are of two main sorts: one is the economic resource or transaction 
dependencies (either financial or commercial); the other is the governance or control 
relations that overlay those dependencies including the equity ties and director ties 
(Lincoln and Gerlach, 2004). In particular, business groups, often as controlling 
shareholders of their affiliated firms, can strengthen their control by dispatching their 
current or previous executives to sit on the boards of their affiliated firms. These 
group-dispatched directors should serve as directors to make decisions in favor of the 
groups instead of affiliated firms, and as supervisors to assure the management at the 
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affiliated firms not to question those decisions (Yeh & Woidtke, 2005). They may 
improve communication, allowing information about group strategies, firm operations, 
market opportunities, innovative strategies etc to pass among firms in the group 
(Keister, 2009). However, I argue that there is more to understand the governance 
role of group-dispatched directors by also observing their relations with the affiliated 
firms.   
I assert that, like other directors, group-dispatched directors can be executive 
directors or non-executive directors. While the control role of group-dispatched non-
executive directors is obvious, the role of group-dispatched executive directors is less 
clear and invites further research. This is because, as executive directors, they are also 
tied with the affiliated firms in various aspects and their interests may gradually align 
better with that of the affiliated firms, rather than with that of the groups. Therefore, 
their presence could play another type of role, helping the affiliated firms under 
management in obtaining resources and pursuing investments that benefit themselves 
more directly with their contacts and influence in the group, or the “resource role”. In 
this study, I take a different approach, endeavoring to propose a contingent 
framework to understand what factors affect the control role or resource role of 
group-dispatched executive directors and how these factors shape investment 
decisions in group-affiliated firms.       
 To theoretically ground my investigation of the control or resource role of 
group-dispatched executive directors, I draw upon identity theory (Mead, 1934; 
Stryker, 1968; Burke and Reitzes, 1981; Callero, 1985; Stryker and Burke, 2000) and 
social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978, 1981; Tajfel and Turner, 1985; Turner, 1975, 
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1982, 1984, 1985). Identity is defined as the shared social meanings that persons 
attribute to themselves in a role (Burke and Reitzes, 1991). Central propositions of 
identity theory states that one categorizes oneself as an occupant of a role, or the 
“identity”, and performs according to the meanings and expectations associated with 
that role (Buke and Tully 1977; Thoits, 1986). The identity theorists make clear that 
“these expectations and meanings form a set of standards that guide behaviors” 
(Burke, 1991; Burke and Reitzes, 1981). Social identity theory provides a similar 
view while focusing on the norms and expectations of a social category and linking 
them to behaviors (Hogg et al., 1995; Ashforth and Mael, 1996). Both theories 
recognize that the self is made up of multiple identities, such as directors and 
executives, and these identities can conflict with one another and, therefore, must be 
“managed” (cf. Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Hoelter, 1983; McCall & Simmons, 1978; 
Thoits, 1983, 1986). Otherwise, the identity conflict can have adverse consequences 
for the performance of the person as well as the business (e.g. Beckhard and Dyer, 
1983). One can manage the conflict by ordering, separating, realigning the 
expectations, priorities of identities (Adler and Adler, 1987; Ashforth and Mael, 1989) 
or balancing various identities in their role system, engaging fully in one role or 
another, depending on circumstances, rather than emphasizing one salient identity 
across all situations (Marks & MacDermid, 1996). Identity salience is the relative 
importance or centrality of a given identity for defining oneself (Hoelter, 1983). An 
identity is salient in particular to a situation and one develops the meaning of an 
identity through the responses of others (Stryker, 1968; Burke & Reitzes, 1981).  
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Recent research on board effectiveness investigates how directors’ multiple 
identities affect board monitoring and resource provision (Hillman, Nicholson, & 
Shropshire, 2008), but this research does not consider the conflicts of multiple 
identities (except the study of Golden-Biddle and Rao, 1997) and qualitative in 
method. In this study, I investigate the role of group-dispatched executive directors 
facing a situation when both their group-affiliation identity and executive identity are 
relevant: assessing a protective investment through unrelated diversification. Utilizing 
the mechanisms and logic of identity theory and social identity theory, I identify 
tenure, firm performance and business tie with the group as especially relevant factors 
to determine salience of a specific identity. More specifically, firstly, I suggest that 
longer tenure that a group-dispatched executive director serves in an affiliated firm 
strengthens her commitment with the affiliated firm, making her executive identity 
more salient. Secondly, better performance of group-affiliated firms, reflecting the 
executive role performance and satisfaction of the role expectations, will also help her 
executive identity become more salient. Lastly, the more an affiliated firm is 
embedded in the business network of its group, the more salient the identity as a 
group-dispatched director is.     
 Extending the literature on corporate governance by integrating identity 
theory and social identity theory, this study provides several contributions to the 
management literature. Firstly, it contributes to the board literature by explaining how 
the salience of multiple identities affects the role of group-dispatched executive 
directors. This effort is a response to the calls for more in-depth examination of both 
directors as individuals and the antecedents of board effectiveness (Finkelstein, and 
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Hambrick, 1996; Hillman et al., 2008). Secondly, this study adds to the literature on 
board of directors by investigating the role of board of directors in strategic 
interference in firms with controlling group shareholders. Recent research suggests 
that a firm’s board of directors affects its strategies (see Pugliese et al., 2009 for a 
review). Focused on large firms with disperse ownership, this work classified the 
directors based on their independence from management (Hillman et al., 2000). In 
firms with concentrated ownership, the research on boards needs to consider the 
relation with and influence of the controlling shareholders (Yeh & Woidtke, 2005).    
4.2 Identity Theory and Multiple Identities 
 Outside of agency theory, several streams of research on governance recently 
emerged, taking a social psychology perspective to understand the behavior aspects of 
board of director (e.g., Golden-Biddle and Rao, 1997; Westphal, 1998; Westphal and 
Fredrickson, 2001; Hillman et al., 2008; Finkelstein et al., 2009; Tuggle, et al., 2010). 
For example, a series of studies by Westphal and colleagues demonstrate how social 
processes such as ingratiatory behavior (Westphal, 1998; Westphal and Stern, 2006), 
demographic similarity (Westphal and Zajac, 1995), social distancing (Westphal and 
Khanna, 2003), pluralistic ignorance (Westphal and Bednar, 2005) and director 
experiences (McDonald et al., 2008) and external network ties (Carpenter and 
Westphal, 2001) influence board behaviors. These studies underscore the importance 
of how context affects the behaviors of directors. 
 Identity theory (Mead, 1934; Stryker, 1968; Burke and Reitzes, 1981; Callero, 
1985; Stryker and Burke, 2000) assumes that the self is made up of multiple identities 
and an individual structures the multiple identities into a salience hierarchy wherein 
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some identities are more central or important. For example, for one person the 
occupational identity may be the dominant aspect of the self, taking precedence over 
other identities and affecting general self-perceptions and actions (Callero, 1985). 
Identity salience is the relative importance or centrality of a given identity for 
defining oneself. The social actors perform according to the meanings and 
expectations associated with salient role identity (Buke and Tully 1977; Thoits, 1986). 
Therefore, the values, norms, and goals that are normative in a salient identity will 
implicitly or explicitly shape much of the individual’s behavior (Burke, 1991; Burke 
and Reitzes, 1981). Similarly, social identity theory views the self as composed of 
multiple identities, but it links the norms and stereotypes of social categories, instead 
of roles, to behaviors (Hogg, 1992). Social identity theory also predicts that 
individuals will tempt to align their actions with the normative behaviors of a social 
identity, depending on the salience of that identity (Hogg et al., 1995; Ashforth and 
Mael, 1996). A salient identity with a business group, for example, may encourage 
one to pursue group goals ahead of goals of the affiliated firm, to interpret issues from 
a group perspective, to cooperate with other group members despite their different 
and possible conflicting interests (Ashforth and Mael, 1996, Dutton et al., 1994; Pratt, 
1998).  The hierarchy of salience is important in predicting behavior in the situation 
when different identities are activated or pertinent. Concurrently activated, different 
identities do not necessarily demand conflicting behaviors. However, sometimes they 
do, and it is under this circumstance that the hierarchy of salience becomes a 
particularly important predictor of behavior.  
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 The literature on identity theory suggests two important mechanisms 
determine the salinence of an identity.  Firstly, “commitment” determines the salience 
of an identity. Stryker (1968) defines commitment as the degree to which one’s 
relationships to specific others depend on one’s being a particular kind of person. 
Commitment actually is a function of social relations (Stryker and Serpe, 1982, 1994), 
both quantitatively and qualitatively. It has two dimensions with the first refers to the 
number of relationship one enters through an identity. The more relationship one is 
tied to by holding an identity (i.e. the greater the embeddedness of the identity in the 
social structure), the more likely it is that the identity will be activated in a situation. 
The second dimension is qualitative—the depth of the relationships entered due to an 
identity. Stronger ties to others through an identity lead to a more salient identity. In a 
similar vein, social identity theorists also suggest that interpersonal interaction, 
similarity, shared goals, and so forth may affect the salience of the group identity 
(Hogg and Turner, 1985; Turner, 1984). Identities are social products that are formed 
through social processes (Stryker, 1968; De Federico de la Rúa, 2007). Once formed, 
it is maintained by social relations. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the 
networks of social relations in which individuals are embedded because this relational 
context shapes one’s identification and strategies (De Federico de la Rúa, 2007).
 Secondly, identity salience is determined by role evaluation. Role evaluation 
is how one performs within and evaluates the roles underlying self-structure. Role 
evaluation implicate identity salience because of the self-enhancement motive (we 
have a need to think well of ourselves) and because self evaluation is often based on 
perceptions of others’ appraisals and social comparisons. The meanings and 
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expectations and assessment of others are seen as critical in shaping one’s behaviors 
in the role (Burke & Reitzes, 1981). Eventually the sources of pressure or 
encouragement to commit oneself to a particular identity, expressed in a consistent 
line of action, may be internalized (Burke & Reitzes, 1981). The logic of identity 
theory suggests that, for example, an executive’s commitment to this role is a 
function of the salience of the executive role to her sense of self, the satisfaction that 
the executive role provides, and the perceived assessment of her performance in the 
executive role by the significant others.  
 Lastly, concerning a social identity with a group, social identity theory 
literature suggests several other factors of organizations which most likely to increase 
the salience of a social identity with an organization: distinctiveness of the group’s 
values and practices (Oakes and Turner, 1986), prestige of the group (Chartman Bell, 
and Staw, 1986; March and Simon, 1958) and the salience of the out-groups (Allen et 
al., 1983). For example, individuals tend to have a salient group identity when the 
group is more prestigious because it improves self-esteem (Mael, 1988).  
In sum, the identity theory states that there may exist multiple and potentially 
conflicting identities within a self, and these identities are hierarchically ordered in 
terms of their salience. In addition, this hierarchy of identity salience is particularly 
important in predicting behavior when different identities are concurrently invoked 
and call for incompatible behaviors. Commitment, in the forms of quantity and 
quality of relationships that relate to an identity, determines the salience of an identity. 
Because identity is reflexive, its salience is also determined by the role evaluation or 
performance. When it comes to the salience of a social identity, other factors like 
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distinctiveness of group value, prestige of the group and the salience of out-groups 
also affect the salience of an identity.   
4.3 Identity Salience of Group-dispatched Executive Directors and Unrelated 
Diversification  
Central to understanding the implications of role-identity conflict on group-
dispatched executive directors is understanding the behavioral expectations associated 
with the identity as group-dispatched directors and that with the identity as executives 
of affiliated firms. Group-dispatched directors refer to those directors, who either 
used to work for the business group, or are currently assuming positions in the 
business group. Their presence recognizes the interdependence between the firms and 
the group owners. They provide (1) access to group level resources; (2) information 
channels with the group; (3) access to group decision makers that may result in 
influence over group level decisions related to the affiliates; and (4) legitimacy 
(Galaskiewica & Wasserman, 1989). The access to group level resources enables 
group affiliates to diversify into new markets. Board ties can also reduce 
informational asymmetries by facilitating the flow of information among firms 
(Haunschild, 1993). The ties enable directors to acquire firsthand knowledge about 
the affiliated firm’s capabilities, activities, and plans through their communications 
with the top management and their involvement in the decision-making process 
(Gulati and Westphal, 1999).  
Since the control role of group-dispatched non-executive directors are 
relatively obvious, this study focuses on group-dispatched executive directors. On one 
hand, these directors, with their group ties, may be expected by a controlling group as 
a better information channel and control mechanism of its affiliated firms. The 
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business group ties attenuate the directors’ fear of confronting the top management 
because the directors have relationship in the group headquarter, which has the 
decision power on appointment and removal of the top management of the affiliated 
firm. They fear less of retaliation from treating the CEO harshly (e.g. Baysinger & 
Hoskisson, 1990; Kesner & Dalton, 1986) because they either hold positions in the 
group headquarter or can be reassigned to another affiliated firm. In addition, their 
promotion within the business group may be linked to their performance as a 
dispatched director. This also provides the directors incentives to serve the group’s 
interest.  
On the other hand, as executives of affiliated firms, executive directors may 
also be expected to safeguard the interest of affiliated firms. Firstly, executive 
directors as agents desire less sharing of profits with other member firms because it 
represents forgone wealth (e.g. according to the equity they own). Low profitability 
of the firm will also jeopardize the executive director’s employment future, either in 
internal promotion of the business group or external job market. To an extreme, a 
delisted firm (e.g. with consecutive negative ROEs) will be unwanted to these 
executive directors because they are likely to face unemployment. Secondly, working 
as the top management in an affiliated firm may give these directors a sense of 
“psychological ownership” towards the firm that motivates loyalty and commitment 
to it (Pierce et al, 2001; Cardon, et al., 2005). Such psychological ownership emerges 
through controlling the firm, coming to intimately know the firm and various 
stakeholders, and investing their time, idea, skills, and energies into the firm. If the 
business group wants to divert profits away from the affiliated firm, or subsidize other 
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money-losing affiliated firms using growth-induced resources in the affiliated firm, 
executive directors are expected to support protective investment decisions, 
influencing the group headquarter in the group level boards or seeking help from their 
network in groups to protect the affiliated firm’s interest.  
The identities as a group-affiliated director and as the executive of an 
affiliated firm can mutually reinforcing; however, this context can also result in 
conflicting role expectations. The existing literature studying how these directors on a 
board may influence an affiliated firm thus far has concerned mostly situations that 
one of their identities is more salient, or both identities predict similar behaviors. In 
this study, I focus on the protective investment through unrelated diversification as a 
circumstance that may trigger conflict between the group-dispatched director and 
executive identities. In approving such strategic decisions, group-dispatched 
executive directors face situations in which both their group-affiliated director and 
executive identity are pertinent. Accessing protective diversification strategy 
represents such a circumstance because in order to evaluate such strategic initiatives, 
board need to have detailed understanding of the underlying operation motive, and 
how new and existing businesses would complement one another (Farjoun, 1994; 
Sirower, 1997). As executives, who are part of the decision-making process, 
executive directors are more likely to gain accurate information about the top 
management and the firm’s operations (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990). In 
comparison, non-executive directors are less capable in discriminating between a 
strategy that is driven by value-enhancing motives and that which is driven by the 
private benefits. Therefore, non-executive directors often lack the type of information 
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needed to be truly effective in controlling decisions (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990). 
In protective diversification context, the executive identity demands preservation of 
the true motive of the investment decision and even help the initiative through 
influencing the group headquarter with their contacts in the group, while the group-
affiliated director identity calls for revealing firm-specific information about the 
strategic decision. This circumstance represents a source of potential conflict under 
which the hierarchy of identity salience becomes potentially an important predictor of 
behavior. In the following section, I will propose a framework to investigate when 
one of the identities is more likely to be more salient. The theoretical framework is 




Figure 4.1 The Theoretical Framework of Chapter 4 
  
4.4 The Salience of Executive Identity 
Two factors may determine the relative salience of the executive identity of a group-
dispatched executive director: tenure and performance at the affiliated firm under his 
management. Research in social psychology suggests that, firstly, tenure in an 
organization is likely to increase both the quantitative and qualitative aspects of the 
person’s commitment to the current role. With longer tenure, executives directors 
gradually develop working relationships with other members of their top management 
teams, other directors, and powerful outside stakeholders (Vancil, 1987; Van 
Knippenberg and van Schie, 2000). They most frequently interact with other 
members in the affiliated firm and may form allies in strategic positions over time 
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executive directors’ centrality in the communication network in the affiliated firm 
(Barkema and Pennings, 1998). Secondly, over time, executive directors may develop 
shared belief systems (Katz, 1982) and tend to perceive that they have more in 
common with the people working in the same organization. Thirdly, the people with 
whom an executive director works closely on daily basis may form a peer subculture 
that emphasizes the interest of the affiliated firm while devaluing the interest of the 
group at large. This peer subculture will also affect the structure of identity salience 
perceived by the executive directors. Such close relationships, shared belief system, 
perceived similarity, and peer subculture are psychologically valued and linking such 
relationships and belief to an identity should make that identity more highly valued 
and therefore more salient (Nuttbrock and Freudiger, 1991). Accordingly, the relative 
influence of an individual director’s executive identity may be weighted by his tenure 
served in the affiliated firm: specifically, group-dispatched executive directors are 
more likely to support protective investment decisions at the affiliated firm if they 
have served long tenure at this firm. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Group-dispatched executive directors on a board will be 
associated with higher level of unrelated diversification strategy in an 
affiliated firm when their relative organizational tenure is high.       
 
 In addition to the commitment proxied by director’s tenure, the salience of the 
executive identity and its effect on protective diversification strategy also depend on 
another factor: the affiliated firm’s performance. Identity theorists have suggested 
that the identity salience depends on how one performs within and evaluates the role 
underlying self-structure (Hoelter, 1983). This self-evaluation can be driven by self-
esteem motive (Stets and Burke, 2000): as a group-dispatched executive director had 
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a salient executive role identity, the evaluation of his or her performance as an 
executive would influence feelings of self-esteem. If his or her role as an executive 
was evaluated positively, the director’s self-esteem would be higher (Hoelter, 1983); 
if the director performed well in the role of executive, he or she would feel good, 
given the appraisals by others and their approval (Franks and Marolla, 1976). The 
self-efficacy mechanism could serve as another explanation: a group-dispatched 
executive director who performed well in her executive role gained a sense of control 
over the environment (Franks and Marolla, 1976; Gecas and Schwalbe, 1983). Thus, 
theory and research on identity would suggest that group-dispatched executive 
directors are likely to weight more their executive identity in the affiliated firms when 
the affiliated firms under their management perform relatively well.  Thus, the group-
dispatched executive directors may be most likely to advocate the protective 
investment. Specifically:   
Hypothesis 2: Group-dispatched executive directors on a board will be 
associated with higher level of unrelated diversification strategy in an 
affiliated firm when the firm’s performance is relatively high.       
 
4.5 The Salience of Group Affiliation Identity 
An important contextual factor that may reinforce the salience of group affiliation 
identity of a group-dispatched executive director is the firm’s dependence on the 
group. Sociology research suggests that economic actors are socially embedded and 
they form relations with others through social exchange (Granovetter, 1985). Group 
affiliated firms conduct various forms of internal transactions with its business group 
such as internal business trade (Lincoln and Gerlach, 2004). Extensive internal selling 
and purchasing of intermediate and final goods (Chang and Hong, 2000) and 
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dependence on group manufactures and trading firms as buyers and sellers of 
products and services create interdependence among the affiliated firms. This is 
especially the case in vertical business groups where suppliers, subcontractors, and 
distributors organized in a vertical division of labor. In this way, affiliated firms form 
close and cooperative relations typical of networks. This organization structure 
functions as a risk sharing system in which each affiliated firm supports the other by 
absorbing some of its costs and risk (Lincoln and Gerlach, 2004). These social 
relations indeed often breed trust and solidarity among the member firms within the 
group. These exchanges embed the affiliated firms and their management into the 
network of the group deeper. Under this situation, group-dispatched executive 
directors are more likely to cognitively associate themselves with the powerful group, 
demonstrating a more salient group affiliation identity.  In this way, they improve 
their self-esteem and facilitate future business with the group. Over time, the 
management at the affiliated firm establishes stronger relationship with the group and 
other group member firms and therefore is more likely to commit to its group 
affiliation identity. The above arguments lead to the following hypothesis:   
Hypothesis 3: Group-dispatched executive directors on a board will be 
associated with lower level of unrelated diversification strategy in an 
affiliated firm when the affiliated firm is more dependent on the group.       
4.6 Methods 
4.6.1 Sample 
The sample frame for this study consisted of 943 group-affiliated listed firms 
from Chinese Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchange from 2003 to 2005. Following 
previous studies, I excluded firms that showed negative equity due to accumulated 
losses, since such firms are technically bankrupt. Further, I excluded firms from the 
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sample because information was missing or because values for some variables 
appeared unrealistic.   
I then coded the affiliation of directors of my sample firms. I obtained the 
profiles of board of directors for all the firms over this period from CSMAR database. 
As a result, I had 18,300 director-year observations. The profile information was in 
Chinese and it was a detailed introduction of a director’s background, including her 
age, education, functional area, and all previous and current working experience. The 
public firms in their annual reports release this information each year. I also obtained 
the information of five largest shareholders from CSMAR. Three steps are involved 
to identify the affiliations of boards of directors. First, the database provides 
information of all positions each director assumes in a firm. Using this information, I 
was able to distinguish executive directors from outsider. Executive directors include 
those directors assume a managerial position in the firm at the same time; while non-
executive directors refer to directors do not assume any managerial position in the 
focal firm. Second, a group of Chinese-speaking assistants carefully reviewed the 
profiles of each director and identified from her working experience whether she 
previously worked, or is currently working for, the largest group owners. Finally, 
after sorting out the directors (first in terms of executive directors vs. non-executive 
directors, second in terms of affiliation to the largest group owner), I combined the 
coding and identified the group-dispatched executive directors within a firm.  
I combined the director information and other firm level data and had a final 
sample of 1944 observations for 790 group-affiliated listed firms over the period of 




Unrelated diversification. Unrelated diversification was measure using an entropy 
index approach (Lubatkin, Merchant and Srinivasan, 1993). The entropy measure of a 
firm’s diversification is defined as "a weighted average of the shares of the segments" 
(Palepu, 1985, p. 252). The weight is assumed to be the logarithm of the inverse of 
the proportion of total business in each segment (Chatterjee & Blocher, 1992). The 
values of indices vary from zero to values greater than one. The greater the value of 
the index, the greater is the diversification level of a firm. The entropy measure is 
attractive because it takes into account "two elements of diversification: (i) the 
number of segments in which a firm operates, and (ii) the relative importance of each 
of the segments in the total sales" (Palepu, 1985, p. 252). 
Using the information on revenues by product category for Chinese listed 
companies, I calculated the entropy indices of unrelated diversification for the year t 
in the following manner. Consider a firm operating in N industry segments (four-digit 
SIC industries). Those N industry segments aggregate into M industry groups (two-
digit SIC industries). Let Pi be the share of the ith segment in the total sales of the 
firm. The unrelated diversification is defined as: 
Unrelated diversification=∑ ∑ Pij ln� 1𝑃𝑖𝑗�iϵjM  
 I use the change of the unrelated diversification (t-t0) in the empirical test.   
 Proportion of Group-dispatched Executive Director.  This is measured as the 
number of group-dispatched directors who also assume executive positions in the 
affiliated firms, divided by the total number of directors. As previously introduced, 
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group affiliation of directors is identified from their working experience whether they 
previously worked, or are currently working for, the group owners. 
 Relative Organizational Tenure of Group-dispatched Executive Directors. 
This is measured as the number of years the director has been employed at their 
current affiliated company divided by firm age.   
 Relative Firm Performance. I employed ROA as the measure of firm 
performance, computed as the ratio of net income to total assets. Wernerfelf and 
Montgomery (1988) find that industry effects account for much for the variation in 
firm performance, it is more reasonable to compare the ROA of a firm with those in 
the same industry. Therefore, I adjusted the industry effect on firm performance by 
computing a relative measure using the firm’s ROA divided by the median ROA in 
the same industry (at the two-digit SIC code level).    
Firm Dependence on the Group. The dependence on the group was proxied 
by the internal trading activities conducted by the affiliated firm and its group. I 
measured internal trading as the total amount of both sales to and purchases from a 
group or other affiliated companies divided by the equity of the firm.   
 Other Controls. Several studies in the corporate diversification literature have 
suggested that the nature and concentration of the ownership of a firm relate to the 
occurrence of diversification (Ramaswamy, Li, and Petitt, 2004). Accordingly, I 
controlled for the shareholding by the group owner and the ownership type of the firm: 
state-owned firm is coded 1 and private-owned firm is 0. Firm size has been shown to 
be associated with diversification levels (Hoskisson et al., 1994) as an indirect 
measure of the resources available to the firm to pursue diversification and 
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acquisition strategies. Thus, I controlled for firm size, measured as the natural 
logarithm of total firm sales. Given the theoretical linkage between leverage and 
diversification as discussed in the literature (Kochhar, 1996;Kochhar and Hitt, 1998) 
and the strong relationship between China’s business groups and banks, it was 
necessary to control for leverage to ensure it was indeed those corporate governance 
variables identified in this study, not the debt level, that were driving diversification 
moves (Ramaswamy, Li, and Petitt, 2004). Leverage was measured as the firm’s debt 
to equity ratio. Finally, I included industry dummy variables at the two-digit SIC code 
level in all models, and I controlled for year by including dummy variables for the N-
1 years in the sample to ensure that results were not dependent upon unspecified, 
time-specific factors.  
4.6.3 Analysis 
To test the hypotheses, I fitted random-effects models by using the GLS estimator 
(producing a matrix-weighted average of the between and within results) to analyze 
how characteristics of group-dispatched executive directors in aggregate level affect 
their identity salience in unrelated diversification strategy. The final data structure is a 
pooled time series, where firm-year represents the observation and the dependent 
variable is the change of the unrelated diversification in year t.  The standard errors 
reported are clustered by firm. Unobserved heterogeneity, which may occur because 
each firm contributes multiple observations that are not independent from each other, 
is always a potential problem in pooled time series (Petersen and Koput, 1991). A 
common approach to addressing problems of unobserved heterogeneity is to insert 
additional firm-specific error terms that are either fixed over time for each firm 
(fixed-effects models), or vary randomly over time for each firm (random-effects 
126 
 
models) (Sayrs, 1989). I used random-effects models for the following reasons. First, 
fixed-effects models typically produce biased estimates of the fixed effects when the 
time period is relatively short (Chintagunta, Jain, and Vilcassim, 1991; Heckman, 
1981). While the time frame of this study is 3 years, some firms contribute less than 3 
observations because they were merged with other firms or because of missing data. 
Second, since most of the firms are either highly diversified or not throughout the 
whole period, the models cannot be estimated using the fixed-effect approach because 
this approach requires variance in both dependent and independent variables to assure 
that these variables are distinguishable from the fixed effects (Judge et al., 1985).  
4.7 Results 
Table 5.1 provides the means, standard deviations, minimums, maximums, and 
bivariate correlations for all data used to analyze predictions of characteristics of 
group-dispatched executive directors’ role in intervening diversification strategy. The 
mean of group-dispatched executive directors is 0.059: 5.9% of the board of directors 
of a group-affiliated firm are affiliated with the controlling group owners. The mean 
of relative organizational tenure suggests that the average organizational tenure of 
group-dispatched executive directors in a group-affiliated firm is as long as 9.3% of 
the firm’s age. The mean of business ties with group indicates that the size of internal 
trading within business groups is around 4.6% of the firm’s equity size. Finally, 
business groups on average hold 45.1% of shareholdings of their group-affiliated 
firms and 89.4% of the group-affiliated firms in our samples are controlled by state.  
The correlations in Panel B show that there is a negative correlation between 
change of unrelated diversification and the percentage of group-dispatched directors, 
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but the correlation is not significant. There is a positive and significant correlation 
between change of unrelated diversification and previous year’s firm performance 
(0.037, p-value<0.1), while the correlations between unrelated diversification and 
firm leverage is negative and significant (-0.063, p-value<0.01).          
Table 5.2 presents the results of the Heckman two-stage corrected regression 
analyses based on the sample of 792 group-affiliated companies. Panel A of Table 5.2 
displays the first stage regression where I regressed the unrelated diversification 
indicator on a set of explanatory variables. Panel B shows the results of the second 
stage regression. I included the inverse mills ratios computed from the first stage 
regression as an additional explanatory variable in all models. Model 1 is the base 
model includes only the percentage of group-dispatched executive directors. Each of 
Model 2-4 includes an intervening factor and the interaction term of this factor with 
the percentage of group-dispatched executive directors. Model 5 is the full model 
including all intervening factors and their interaction terms at the same time. 
The predicted variable in Panel B is the change of unrelated diversification 
strategies in the sample firms. The patterns of results support the intervention theory: 
the intervention effect of directors on diversification strategy is contingent on 
different characteristics of directors. Model 1 shows the main effect of group-
dispatched executive directors on change of unrelated diversification is significantly 
negative. This result suggests that higher presence of group-dispatched directors is 
likely to be associated with a controlling role, reducing unrelated diversification at the 
group-affiliated firm level. Hypothesis 1 predicts that the relative organizational 
tenure will moderate the group-affiliation identity of group-dispatched directors and 
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strengthen their executive identity, leading to a higher level of unrelated 
diversification. Model 2 testing this hypothesis provides support to it, showing a 
positive and significant interaction effect (β=0.086, p-value<0.01). Similarly, Model 
3 confirms my prediction in Hypothesis 2 that relative better firm performance will 
also strengthen the executive identity and mitigate the group-affiliation identity of the 
group-dispatched executive directors, resulting further unrelated diversification 
moves. The coefficient on relative firm performance is 0.006 (p-value<0.01). Model 4 
tests the intervening effect of the business ties with groups and shows a significantly 
negative intervening effect of business ties with group on the effect of group-
dispatched directors on unrelated diversification (β=-0.173, p-value<0.05). The 
results support to my prediction that closer ties with business groups, measured by 
trading activities, will strengthen the group-affiliation identity of a firm, and of the 
firm’s executive directors.  Model 5 includes all three intervening factors. Among the 
three factors, the negative effect of business ties with group is the largest (with an 
impact size of 0.333) and most significant (p-value<0.05).  
All control variables significantly predicted the change of unrelated 
diversification strategies in group-affiliated firms. First, the group’s shareholding (the 
largest shareholding) shows a negative effect on unrelated diversification. Secondly, 
state-controlled group-affiliated firms show a negative tendency towards unrelated 
diversification. Finally, firm size and leverage level attract significant negative 
coefficients; while firm age takes positive significant coefficients.   
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4.8 Summary  
This chapter focuses on the internal governance mechanisms through 
dispatched directors in business groups. The empirical model tested the effects of 
contextual and reflexive factors on the salience of conflicting identities of group-
dispatched executive directors in pursuing unrelated diversification strategies.  The 
results show that, in general, executive directors are dispatched from the group 
function a control role in group-affiliated firms. Higher proportion of group-
dispatched executive directors presented in the board of an affiliated firm, less 
unrelated diversification it will pursue. This control role, however, is mitigated by 
contextual and reflexive factors influencing the salience of multiple identities inherent 
in group-dispatched executive directors. Longer organizational tenure and better 
economic performance of the affiliated firm will raise the salience of executive 
identity with the affiliated firm in these directors. Meanwhile, the results also indicate 
that business groups can strengthen the group affiliation identity of these directors by 
engaging in more business activities with the focal firm, embedding the directors into 
the group network.  
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 Table 4.1Descriptive and Correlations Statistics 
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Change of unrelated diversification -0.007  0.261  -1.397  1.595  
Group-dispatched executive directors 0.059  0.119  0.000  0.833  
Relative organizational tenure of group-
dispatched executive directors (Relative 
Tenure) 
0.093  0.182  0.000  1.000  
Relative firm performance 0.437  8.980  -22.288  19.024 
Business ties with group 0.046  0.160  0.000  1.741  
Group  shareholding 0.451  0.167  0.060  0.850  
Firm size (ln_sales) 17.063  4.641  3.340  24.982  
Firm leverage (log) 0.006  0.674  -3.317  5.453  
Firm age (log) 2.457  0.488  0.693  5.004  







Panel B. Correlations Statistics of Variables 
 Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 
 Change of unrelated diversification 1         
2 Group-dispatched executive directors -0.023  1        
3 Relative organizational tenure of group-dispatched executive directors (Relative Tenure) 0.002  0.489
*  1       
4 Relative firm performance 0.037*  0.000  -0.011  1      
5 Business ties with group 0.005  -0.075*  -0.097*  -0.071*  1     
6 Group  shareholding 0.005  0.057*  0.119*  0.097*  0.125*  1    
7 State control -0.005  0.017  0.041*  0.030  0.025  0.158*  1   
8 Firm size 0.022  0.097*  0.169*  0.076*  -0.383*  0.163*  0.068*  1  
9 Firm leverage -0.063*  -0.019  -0.024  -0.060*  -0.019  -0.159*  -0.015  -0.105*  1 
10 Firm age 0.019  -0.025  -0.203*  0.003  0.074*  -0.202*  -0.092*  -0.274*  0.012  





Table 4.2 Multiple Identities of Group-dispatched Executive Directors and Unrelated Diversification: Random Effect GLS Models 
  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 











Relative organizational tenure   0.009 (0.86)   
0.016 
(1.41) 














  0.081** 
(2.33) 
Group-dispatched executive directors 
*Relative firm performance 




Group-dispatched executive directors 
*Dependence on group 























































Number of firms 788 788 776 774 720 
Observations 1985 1985 1928 1911 1657 
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CHAPTER 5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 Implications of Results for Theory 
5.1.1 Diversification and Internal Resource Transfer in Business Groups 
In the first study of diversification and internal resource transfer in business 
groups, I find evidence to support the power-seeking hypothesis that top management 
in business group-affiliated firms adopts unrelated diversification as a protective 
investment in order to protect self-generated resources and compete for more group-
level resources. Unrelated diversification can increase a group-affiliated firm’s 
bargaining power in group-level resource allocation decision, transfer liquid assets 
into physical assets to avoid resource transfer, and signal to the group the need of 
resources. In this way, unrelated diversification may create value to a group-affiliated 
firm. In particular, if the expected expropriation costs are large enough, seemingly 
negative net present value unrelated diversification invests are actually in the best 
interests of the group-affiliated firms. In other words, the presence of a significant 
threat of expropriation makes diversification a value-creating proposition (Beneish, et 
al., 2008; Stulz, 2005).  
My conceptual and empirical focus on diversification strategies as a distinct 
form of protective investments for managers in group-affiliated firms yields several 
insights to the business group literature and diversification literature. First, previous 
business group literature suggests that group owners decide to prop or tunnel a group-
affiliated firm based on factors including ownership structure, economic times, or the 
performance of the affiliated firms. The role of managers in group-affiliated firms is 
minimized in this decision. However, in this study, using an enriched power-seeking 
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perspective of internal market in the business group context, I argue that managers in 
group-affiliated firms adopt strategic choices to influence the internal resource 
allocation. This is driven by the facts of divergent interests, information asymmetry 
and their desire for more resource slack. This study therefore suggests that strategy 
researchers should pay attention to the internal power struggle problems internal to 
the business group organization. The results indicate that on one hand, the power-
seeking problem may lead to resource misallocation in business groups. On the other 
hand, the results also indicate that the power-seeking problem may mitigate, to some 
extent, the tunneling problem stemming from controlling group owners because the 
managers in affiliated firms have incentives and ability to protect their firms’ interests.  
Second, the evidence that managers in group-affiliated firms diversify to 
influence internal resource allocation contributes to the literature that found it 
difficult to explain diversification strategies at the group-affiliated firm level. 
Previous diversification literature, both efficiency perspective and agency perspective, 
emphasizes the impact of slack resources on diversification. Basically, they argue that 
slack resources drove diversification, for either efficiency purposes or agency 
purposes. Applying this argument to explain the diversification strategy in group-
affiliated firms may lead to the conjecture that access to more resources at the group-
level induces group-affiliated firms to diversify. In this study, my findings provide a 
more refined explanation to the relationship of the slack resources and diversification 
strategy in group-affiliated firms. The results show that managers in group-affiliated 
firms use private information to adopt diversification strategies with an aim to 
compete for more slack resources accumulated at the group level and to protect their 
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affiliated firms’ growth-induced slack. The results indicate that diversification 
strategy is more likely to be adopted by affiliated firms with relative more slack 
resources, which is consistent with the prediction of previous diversification studies. 
The underlying logic, however, could be that such strategies allow the firms to protect 
their slack resources from being shared.   
Third, this study shows that the market availability and redeployability of a 
resource determine its subsequent influence on the outcome of diversification 
strategies. The characteristics of “market availability” closely parallel “rarity” 
proposed by another study (Voss et al. 2008) examining the rarity and absorption of a 
slack resource and the effect on exploration and exploitation actions. I find that 
acquiring more market unavailable redeployable resources (e.g. intangible assets) 
from the group will benefit the profitability of diversification moves, while acquiring 
more market available redeployable resources (e.g. financial resources) from the 
group will lead to poorer performance of diversification strategy at the affiliated firm 
level. The results of this study suggest that, on one hand, though holding a modicum 
of financial slack resources is critical for the success of diversification strategies, too 
much financial slack may exert a negative influence on the performance outcome of 
this strategy. This finding is consistent with the traditional agency theory arguments 
for diversification.  On the other hand, for market unavailable redeployable resources 
(e.g. intangible assets), the efficiency arguments seem to have more prediction power. 
In this way, this study serves as an effort to reconcile the divergent arguments of 




Fourth, this study also extends the power-seeking perspective (Scharfstein & 
Stein, 2000; Rajan, Servaes, & Zingales, 2000). I enrich the framework with elements 
from influence cost models and the behavior theory of firm and highlight the 
information asymmetry problem in resource allocation decision in diversified 
organizations. I argue that it is difficult for group headquarters to differentiate value-
increasing investments from investments driven by self-preserving purpose in group-
affiliated firms because of information asymmetry problem. Though top management 
intends to transfer resources from the more efficient divisions to the less efficient 
divisions (Rajan et al, 2000), they may not have sufficient antecedent information to 
do so. Therefore, managers in group-affiliated firms can actually mitigate this 
resource misallocation problem described in framework through “defensive 
investments”. As a result, the inefficiency of internal resource allocation within 
multidivisional organizations lies in the fact that group resources are transferred to 
less efficient projects, such as unrelated diversification, rather than to less efficient 
divisions. In addition, this study uses direct internal resource transfer data to 
investigate the internal market. Previous studies investigating internal capital market 
often rely on segment data in multi-division firms in US. Because these companies do 
not reveal their internal fund/resource transfer among segments, these studies have to 
resort to indirect measures of funds transfer or cross-subsidy, for example, the 
difference between a division’s capital expenditures and a single-segment firm’s 
capital expenditure (e.g. Lang and Stulz, 1994; Scharfstein, 1998; Rajan et al., 2000). 
This study, using detailed related party transaction data in business groups, 
investigates the internal capital allocation directly.   
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5.1.2 The Contingent Role of Group-dispatched Executive Directors 
Overall, the findings of the second study on the contingent role of group-
dispatched executive directors offer new insights into how board of directors can 
influence corporate strategy by incorporating the identity perspective. I find that 
board of directors, in particular, executive directors dispatched directors, face the 
potential for conflict in diversification strategy decision as they attempt to reconcile 
the expectations, values, and characteristics of their multiple identities: group-
affiliation identity and firm executive identity. The identity perspective reveals much 
about the process of internalizing the expectations and values of an identity and about 
how this process could result in different behaviors. This perspective provides a new 
and important lens for governance research (Hillman, Nicholson, & Shropshire, 2008).   
The finding that higher presence of group-dispatched executive directors is 
negatively associated with unrelated diversification indicates that these directors 
serve mainly a controlling role in group-affiliated firms. They constrain the protective 
investment decisions through unrelated diversification. Their controlling role, 
however, can be mitigated by two contextual and reflective factors: the organizational 
tenure of the directors serving on the board of directors in the group-affiliated firms 
and the performance of the group-affiliated firms. More specifically, the longer the 
group-dispatched executive directors serve on the board of an affiliated firm, the 
more likely they identify themselves as first executives of the firm and then directors 
dispatched by the group. Therefore, in protective diversification decisions where both 
their executive identity and group-affiliation identity are relevant, they will tend to 
follow the expectation associated with executive identity, resulting in higher level of 
such strategy. Similarly, since the salience of an identity is “reflexive” (Burke & 
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Reitzes, 1981), better performance of one role identity can result in more salience of 
this identity. I find that when a group-affiliated firm under management is performing 
relatively well in its industry, the executive identity can be more salient and mitigate 
the controlling role of the group-dispatched directors in diversification strategy.  
Moreover, the controlling role of group-dispatched executive directors can be 
strengthened by the business ties between an affiliated firm and its group. Such ties 
embed the executive directors into a deeper social exchange network within the 
business groups and form stronger commitment to the group. In addition, higher such 
ties also indicate a economic prominence of the group to the affiliated firm because of 
higher level of economic dependence on supply chains or sales channels. Therefore, 
stronger business ties with group can strengthen the identity of group affiliation in 
group-dispatched executive directors.  
This study, adopting an identity perspective to examine behaviors of board of 
directors, has significant implications to (1) the board of directors literature, (2) and 
the business group governance literature. First, this study contributes to board of 
directors literature through a better understanding of how group-dispatched executive 
directors affect corporate strategy through boardroom activities. Much of the existing 
research on boards assumes that demographic characteristics are good predictors of 
boardroom behavior. This research, however, did not address how group-dispatched 
executive directors cope with the potential conflicting role-identities emphasized in 
the role conflict literature (e.g. Gross, Mason and McEachern, 1958; Hall, 1972; 
Adler and Adler, 1981). Without understanding the strength of a director’s 
identification with different roles, it will be difficult to predict the behaviors of a 
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director. Regarding group-dispatched executive directors, when the two identities of 
group affiliation and firm executive are conflicting, those with strong identification 
with firm executive may not engage in controlling activities as those with strong 
identification with group affiliation. In addition, agency theorists often focus on the 
role of incentives such as equity compensation for directors to engage in board 
functions, yet several scholars note that this compensation may not be enough to 
affect boardroom behavior (Daily et al. 1999, Daily and Dalton 2002). The model 
proposed in this study also emphasizes the role of incentives, but instead of focusing 
on extrinsic rewards as motivation (e.g., money), to engage in board functions, I 
examine the intrinsic motivation to do so that comes from a strong identification with 
relevant board identities. 
 Similarly, according to resource dependence theory, group-dispatched 
executive directors will use their human and social capital to benefit the firm. Yet my 
arguments suggest this is only true if the director strongly identifies with the firm. If 
he has only weak identification with the firm, he is unlikely to use his human and 
social capital to benefit the firm. Alternatively, if a director’s identification with the 
group is strong, he may be the group’s vigilant monitor and facilitate resources 
transfer from the firm. I argue that directors’ salience structure of multiple 
contextually relevant identities will determine the behaviors of the directors.  
 The second contribution of this study is to the business group governance 
literature. My findings suggest that to enable individuals to view themselves as being 
in the same boat and regard group-level goals more positively, business groups 
should create interdependencies and communication channels among group-affiliated 
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firms, rotating members through various affiliated firms and tying rewards to group 
goals. These findings are consistent with the tactics suggested by the organizational 
behavior research (Ashforth and Johnson, 2001).  
5.2 Limitation of Study 
This dissertation is subject to several limitations. The first limitation concerns 
the sample used for analysis. This study used the listed companies in China as its 
empirical sample and identified the firms that are affiliated with business groups or 
independent according to their ownership structure reported in annual reports. In the 
context of China, most business groups have only one listed affiliated company.  The 
complete financial and governance data of all group-affiliated firms within each 
business group is not available. As a result, in Chapter 3, I tested my power-seeking 
hypothesis of diversification strategy in group-affiliated firms through comparing the 
diversification level of individual group-affiliated firms in various business groups 
without controlling the group-level characteristics. For example, the average 
diversification level in group-affiliated firms in a business group is likely to be higher 
than that in group-affiliated firms in another business group. Similarly, because of 
this data limitation, I was not able to control for the relative efficiency of different 
affiliated firms in a group. Prior internal market studies emphasize that the relative 
efficiency of different divisions/ affiliated firms determine the resource allocation 
decision in a diversified organization. In addition, due to the data limitation in 
governance data of group-affiliated firms in a business group, I employed a relatively 
indirect measure of commitment to business group in Chapter 4. I used the trading 
activities with business group of the focal affiliated firm but does not directly assess 
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the commitment at the board of directors level. With data of detailed director 
interlocks across group-affiliated firms, a more direct measure of the group-
dispatched directors’ commitment to group can be used. 
The second potential limitation is that, in Chapter 3, I measured slack 
resources relatively indirectly using the level of net inflow of resources into a group-
affiliated firm. Though resources accumulated at the group level and transferred into 
a group-affiliated firm is a source of “slack” (Cyert & March, 1963), I could not 
ascertain whether resources transferred from a group-affiliated firm is indeed “excess 
resources”. Since I lacked measures of performance relative to aspirational target 
level of performance in an affiliated firm, I was unable to specifically account for 
how deviations from these targets may influence strategic choices (March & Shapira, 
1992). Similar problem was also faced by prior studies in studying slack resources 
(e.g. Voss et al., 2008).   
5.3 Conclusions 
In conclusion, this dissertation contributes to understanding diversification 
strategies in business group-affiliated firms, the links between slack resources and 
outcome of diversification strategies. My findings point to the importance of 
considering the information asymmetry and interest divergence problems in 
diversified organizations that lead to the internal power seeking behaviors of 
management at affiliated firm level. The overall message is that managers in group-
affiliated firms adopt unrelated diversification strategy in order to protect or compete 
for more redeployable resources. Acquiring market unavailable resources has 
conferred competitive advantage to group-affiliated firms and facilitates the 
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diversification moves. In contrast, more market available resources may strengthen 
the agency issues in group-affiliated firms and lead to imprudent investments with 
lower subsequent returns.  
This dissertation, in Chapter 4, further contributes to understanding how 
governance mechanisms in business groups influence the diversification strategies in 
group-affiliated firms. The findings suggest the importance of group governance 
mechanisms in mitigating the problems. This study applied a new theoretical lens to 
disentangle the role of board of directors in influencing firm strategies when facing 
multiple potential conflict identities. The identity and social identity theories provide 
new insights to understand the internal mechanisms that explain the behavior of board 
of directors. The findings are consistent with the recent research suggesting that a 
firm’s board of directors affect the firm’s strategies. I show that a firm’s 
diversification strategy is associated with the composition of the board of directors, 
and the contextual and reflexive factors that affect the behavior of a typical type of 
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